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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to re-create and analyze the mood
and sentiments of the editors of twelve representative Virginia nex/spapers during the years immediately preceding the outbreak of World
War II* This study of editorial opinion on foreigxx affairs deals with
the critical period between the Ethiopian crisis and the neutrality
legislation of 1935 and the Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939. The author’s
primary aim is not to describe in detail world events as they actually
occurred during the period under study; rather it is to depict what the
editors thought was happening— real or imagined— and what they felt should
be done to improve world conditions.
It is impossible to determine precisely to what extent newspaper
editorials influenced and reflected public opinion in the 1930’s. Cer
tainly , however, it should be safe to assume that newspapers played a
very important role— either directly or indirectly— in shaping and
mirroring popular sentiments during the pre-television days of the late
1930’s. That the editorial page significantly influenced the masses in
any direct way is doubtful. On the other hand, as an observer of
Southern attitudes on foreign policy has emphasized, that minority wrhich
does read editorials probably influences considerably the thinking of
others. Furthermore, the editor of the local newspaper occupies a posi
tion that can have a significant impact "both on local opinion and local
officials."*
Important also is the fact that a close reading of the viewpoints
presented by editors enables one to appreciate more fully the trends of
thought and the flavor of the debate on critical issues. The reader can
again sense the emotions and hear the arguments used to support opinions—
arguments that often were revised and elaborated and hence frequently
occupied newspaper space for a considerable length of time.
The results of this study appear to demonstrate that rather widely
held views about Southern internationalist sentiment during the late
1930’s may be in need of revision.
If sentiments expressed by Virginia
newspaper editors reflect how other Southern editors felt, an investiga
tion of Southern newspapers should prove to be well worthwhile. For a
major conclusion of this paper is that the traditional criteria of
political partisanship and geography are not completely sufficient gauges
for measuring editorial attitudes in Virginia towards international affairs
and American foreign policy between 1935 and 1939.
*Alfred 0. Hero, Jr., The Southerner and World Affairs (Baton Rouge,
1966), p. 648.
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VIRGINIA NEWSPAPER EDITORS AND
THE COMING OF WORLD WAR II
1935 - 1939

INTRODUCTION:

THE TIMES, THE NEWSPAPERS, THE OBJECTIVES

In the spring of 1917 the United States embarked on a crusade
to save the world for democracy.

Three years later Americans were

yearning for a return to normalcy, and with the election of Warren
/
G. Harding many breathed a sigh of relief.

An important consequence

of the war to end all wars was an atmosphere that left many Americans
disillusioned and apathetic about world events well into the 1930’s.
„ By the mid 1930’s many in this country feared that the United
States might pursue the same dangerous path to x^ar that it had
followed during the three years prior to April 1917.

A clear reflection

of the increasing concern of Americans during the thirties was evident
in the mounting popularity of the revisionist school of historians
which enjoyed its heyday during the interwar period.'*’ Vigorously
supported by many journalists and politicians, the revisionist or
disillusionist historians attempted to revise the standard or generally
accepted interpretations of the origins of World War I and of America’s
intervention in the war.

By the mid-thirties such standard views as

Charles Seymour’s that the submarine was the crucial issue in American
entry in 1917 could not compete in popularity with the revisionist

■*■Among the Virginia editors, Walter Millis was by far the most
popular and most quoted of the revisionist historians. The editor of
the Charlottesville Daily Progress (May 2, 1935, p. 4), for example,
wrote that Millis’ "research will be of positive value in creating
sentiment for strict American neutrality in the next conflict." The
editor of the Richmond Times Dispatch (October 5, 1935, p.6) described
as an "excellent book" Millis’ The Road to War, 1914-1917 (Boston, 1935).
2

3
. 2
interpretations.

Although the names of the revisionists were not household words,
it was men like Harry Elmer Barnes, C. Hartley Grattan, Charles A.
Beard, and Walter Millis who expressed sentiments that most accurately
reflected those of an increasing number of Americans during the four or
five years preceding the Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939.

3

Barnes,

bitter about the results of the negotiations among the Machiavellian
diplomats at Versailles, considered the chances of a second world war
to be strengthened by what he labeled "a league of victors rather than
a league of nations."

Barnes viewed the League as an "Anglo-French

organization" designed to perpetuate capitalistic imperialism by such
means as the mandate system.

4

Grattan, a student of Barnes at Clark University, wrote the first
significant work on American entry, Why We Fought, in 1929.

While he

minimized the significance of British propaganda, Grattan attributed
considerable importance to economic interpretations of the war.

But

it was not until 1936 when the influence of the Nye Committee’s
investigations of the war industries was felt that Grattan would go so
far as to write:

"Economic entanglements with the Allied Powers in the

First World War made the participation of the United States in it on the

Charles Seymour, American Diplomacy during the World War
(Baltimore, 1934), esp. pp. 24, 210.
3
A highly sympathetic but extremely valuable guide for studying
revisionist historiography is Warren I. Cohen’s The American Revis
ionists : The Lessons of Intervention in World War I (Chicago, 1967).
4
Harry Elmer Barnes, The Genesis of the World W a r : An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt (Nexv York, 1926), p. 694.

4

side of the Allies possible, logical, and in the end necessary for
the health of private capitalism; the wartime policies of the United
States Government made participation .inevitable*"'*
In The Idea of National Interest Beard also demonstrated his
conviction that commercial and other economic ties with the Allies
forced the United States into the war.^

In another of his books,

Beard presented his concept of American "continentalism," the idea
that domestic reform and work towards a planned economy should come
before international crusades.

The author noted that

There are millions of American people . . . who are
lacking the security, sanitary conveniences, medical services,
educational opportunities, and habits of industry which Amer
ican statesmen of the industrialist school are eager to supply
to the "benighted" in distant and foreign places . . . . Those
who are deeply moved in the virtuous sense implied by "the
white m a n ’s burden" can, in view of the condition of several
million Negroes in the United States, probably find extensive
outlets for their moral urges at home.7
.Millis, a writer for the New York Herald Tribune, wrote a
highly readable work titled Road to War which became a Book-of-the-Month
Club selection.

To a great extent, particularly in its treatment of

Allied propaganda and of financial and commercial entanglements with
Great Britain, Road to War is merely a summation and synthesis of
previous revisionist works.

In at least one respect, however, Millis

contributed something new to the revisionist cause.

In an examination

of the ambivalent reactions of human beings— including "peace-loving

C.
Hartley Grattan, Preface to Chaos (1936), quoted in
Richard W. Leopold’s "The Problem of American Intervention, 1917:
An Historical Retrospect,” World Politics, II(April 1950), 414.
Much of Grattan’s Why We Fought (New York, 1929) also deals with
economic implications.

6
Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest (New York,
1934), p. 313.
^Charles A. Beard, The Open Poor at Home, A Trial Philosophy
of National Interest (New York, 1934), p. 55.

Americans"— to war, Millis emphasized that "war is terrible; it is also
glamorous, and because of its appalling terror it exercises a compelling
g
fascination."
He then attempted to interpret the "Preparedness" campaign
as an imitation of Europe, a Europe Americans supposedly feared but, on
the other hand, a Europe experiencing a war that appealed to the psyche
of many Americans.

In short, preparedness "provided the thrill [of
9

European war] at the moment that it promised to prevent the damage."
Such psychological interpretation as this prompted Millis to conclude
that the United States had drifted and blundered into the war and that
once intervention did come, no American "quite knew how it had happened,
nor why, nor what precisely it might mean.

„10

The revisionists’ fear that "deadly parallels" existed between the
1910’s and the 1930’s was also shared by Congressmen.

Their fear was

probably reflected best in the neutrality legislation of the thirties.
This legislation demonstrates vividly the strong faith many Americans
of that period had in law as a means to shield or isolate them and to
prevent them from being duped into another foreign war.

The degree to

which historical analogies permeated the legislation was evident in the
New York Herald Tribune’s description of the 1937 Neutrality Act as "An
Act to Preserve the United States from Intervention in the War of 19171918.u11

g
Millis, Road to War, p. 93.
9Ibid.
10Ibid., p. 460.
"^Quoted in Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy
(New York, 1963), p. 570.

The act of 1937 was designed, at least on paper, to prevent
the recurrence of basic developments that revisionists considered
instrumental in America*s 1917 entry.

Should a war break out between

two or more powers, the United States would impose a ban on the export
of arms and of loans to belligerents and would make it illegal for
American citizens to travel on belligerent vessels.

By minimizing

economic entanglements recently stressed by the Nye Committee and by
reducing the chances for emotional reactions such as those created, by
the sinking of the Lusitania, many Americans felt this country could
isolate itself from the problems of Europe.
The susceptibility of many Americans to historical analogies
in the thirties was reflected also in an article written by a local
columnist for the Richmond Times Dispatch. Writing during the height
of the Czechoslovakian controversy in the fall of 1938, the columnist
expressed his fear that if emotional reactions did not soon subside,
he might "see again photographs made from wax images of handless children,
but this time they will be labeled TCzechoslovakian children* instead
of fBelgian children*.
The mounting world crises of the late thirties strengthened the
revisionists* concern about World War I and its consequences.

Believing

that they had been tragically misled in the 1910*s, the logical reaction
of the revisionists was to attempt to prevent a repeat performance in
the 1930*s.

There were undoubtedly enough potential Sarajevos in the

years immediately preceding the outbreak of World War II to make Americans
shudder with fear.

The Italo-Ethiopian conflict, the undeclared

Sino-Japanese war, and the events leading up to the Munich Conference

12

Thomas Lomax Hunter, "As It Appears to the Cavalier," Richmond
Times Dispatch, September 20, 1938, p. 6.

were certainly among the most critical developmentsabroad to arouse
fears in this country.
This paper focuses its attention upon some of the major world
crises between 1935 and the Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939.

The

author*s concern, however, is not so much with what actually happened
abroad as it is with how one small element of the American community
reacted to what it thought was occurring overseas.

The author concentrates

on the opinions of twelve Virginia newspaper editors representing both
urban and rural areas in both daily and weekly newspapers.

What follows

are brief sketches of the newspapers.
The five weeklies include the Bedford Democrat, the Front Royal
Warren Sentinel, the Louisa Central Virginian, the South Boston Halifax
Gazette, and the Williamsburg Virginia Gazette.

Bedford, located in

southwestern Virginia about twenty-five miles southwest of Lynchburg,
was a town of less than four thousand during the thirties.

The Bedford

Democrat, established in 1886, was Democratic politically, had a circula
tion of approximately 2400, and was published and edited during the 1930*s
by M. T. Harrison, who became editor in 1892.

13

Front Royal, which had a population of approximately 2500 during
the 1930*s, is located in northern Virginia eighty miles west of Washington,
D. C.

Established in 1869 as an independent newspaper, the Front Royal

Warren Sentinel had a circulation of about 1600 and was edited by

13

J. Percy H. Johnson, ed., N. W. Ayer and Sons Directory of
Newspapers and Periodicals (Philadelphia, 1939), p. 927. Lester
J. Cappon, Virginia Newspapers, 1821-1935 (New York, 1936), p. 50.

F. A. Stoutamyer until 1937 when L. E. Allen took over.

14

Louisa, situated in central Virginia about fifty miles northwest
of Richmond was a rural community of about three hundred inhabitants
during the thirties.

The Louisa Central Virginian was founded in 1912

as a Democratic newspaper.

Twelve years later George McD. Blake became

editor and remained in that position through the 1930’s when the Central
Virginian had a circulation of almost one thousand.
South Boston, a town of less than five thousand during the 1930’s,
is located in southern Virginia thirty-two miles northeast of Danville.
Established in 1903 as a Democratic newspaper, the South Boston Halifax
Gazette ’s editor from 1926 through the thirties was J. E. Wood.

No

circulation figures are available . ^
A town of less than four thousand during the 1930Ts, Williamsburg
is in southeastern Virginia twenty-eight miles west of Newport News.
Originally founded in 1736, the Williamsburg Virginia Gazette was
re-established in 1930 as an independent newspaper by J. A. Osborne who
was also managing editor during the thirties.

Circulation figures are

not available.^
The seven dailies used in this paper include the Alexandria
Gazette, the Fredericksburg Free Lance Star, the Roanoke Times, the
Danville Register, the Charlottesville Daily Progress, the Norfolk

^ A y e r ’s Directory (1937), p. 932; Ayer’s Directory (1939), p. 930
Cappon, Virginia Newspapers, p. 93.
Ayer’s Directory (1939), p. 931; Cappon, Virginia Newspapers,
pp. 115-116.
16
Ayer’s Directory (1939), p. 936; Cappon, Virginia Newspapers,
p. 205.
“^ A y e r ’s Directory (1939), p. 937; Cappon, Virginia Newspapers,
p. 225.

Virginian Pilot, and the Richmond Times Dispatch.

Situated on the

Potomac River six miles south of Washington, D. C . , Alexandria had
a population of about 24,000 in the late thirties.

Established original

ly in 1784, the Alexandria Gazette prides itself on being America’s
oldest daily newspaper in continuous publication.

With a circulation

of over five thousand in the thirties, the editor of the Gazette, a
Democratic paper, was Charles C. Carlin, Jr.

18

For all but twenty-four

of its 185 years, the Alexandria Gazette has been controlled by two
families, the Snowdens and the Carlins.
New Jersey, bought the paper in 1808.

Samuel Snowden, a native of
Three more generations of

Snowdens succeeded to the position of publisher before Charles C. Carlin,
Sr. acquired the Gazette in 1911.

His father was the publisher of a

weekly newspaper in Warrenton, Virginia, during the middle of the nine
teenth century.

Charles C. Carlin, Sr., represented his district, the

Eighth, in the United States Congress from 1907 to 1919. His son, Charle
_
,f
* C. Carlin, Jr., served as President and Editor of the Gazette from 1924
"

"

"

i

t

"

.

'

until his death in 1966 when his wife assumed both of his positions.

19

Fredericksburg, located in eastern Virginia fifty miles southwest
of Washington, D. C., was a town of almost seven thousand in the late
thirties.

The Fredericksburg Free Lance Star, a Democratic paper, had

a circulation then of over five thousand.
assumed that position in 1926.

Its editor, Josiah P. Rowe, Jr

20

18
Ayer’s Directory (1939), p. 926; Cappon, Virginia Newspapers,
pp. 42-43.

19
Alexandria Gazette, June 26, 1969, p. A-2.

.

20
Ayer’s Directory (1939), p. 929; Cappon, Virginia Newspapers,
pp. 90-91.

10

A city of almost seventy thousand in the late thirties, Roanoke
is located in southwestern Virginia one hundred and seventy miles west
of Richmond.

Established in 1886, the Roanoke Times, an Independent

Democratic paper, had as its editor during the thirties H. Powell Chapman.
Owned then as now by the Times-World Corporation, the Times counted
almost 28,000 subscribers.

21

Situated in southern central Virginia near the North Carolina
border, Danville had a population of 22,000 in the thirties.

Rorer

A. James, Jr., was the Danville Register *s owner and editor from 1922
until 1937 when Michael Bradshaw became editor.

A Democratic paper

founded in 1848, the Register had a circulation of more than ten
thousand in the thirties.

22

Charlottesville, located in central Virginia about seventy
miles northwest of Richmond, was a town of 15,000 in the years
immediately preceding World War II.
,* ■
*

Established in 1892 as a weekly

by J. H. Lindsay, the Charlottesville Daily Progress was published in
the 1930's by his sons, J. G. and W. E. Lindsay, and was edited by
Joseph K. Irving, who became managing editor of the Lynchburg News in
the 1940's.

A Democratic paper, the Daily Progress had a circulation

of approximately five thousand during the late thirties.

23

The city of Norfolk in Hampton Roads had a population of 130,000

21
Ayer's Directory (1939), p. 935; Cappon, Virginia Newspapers,
p. 197.
22Ayer's Directory (1937), p. 931; Ayer's Directory (1939), p. 92.9;
Cappon, Virginia Newspapers, pp. 79-80.
23
Ayer's Directory (1939), p. 928; Cappon, Virginia Newspapers,
pp. 65-66; Lindsay B. Mount, present executive editor of the Charlottesville
Daily Progress, to author, June 2, 1969.

11

in the late thirties.

Originally a Democratic paper when established

in 1898, the Norfolk Virginian Pilot became Independent Democratic in
1915.

By the thirties the paper had a circulation of over 44,000 and

an editor named Louis I. Jaffe who acquired the position in 1919 and held
it for the next thirty years.

24

Prior to joining the Virginian Pilot

staff, Jaffe had been a political reporter and assistant city editor of
the Richmond Times Dispatch.

A strong opponent of the Virginia poll

tax, Jaffe was also hailed in liberal circles for his unyielding antilynching convictions.

His editorial commentary on the lynching evil

won him the 1928 "Pulitzer Prize in journalism for distinguished editorial
writing . .

— the first award of any Pulitzer Prize in journalism, and

the highest award of any kind that had been made to a Virginia newspaper,,25
man.
Richmond, the state capital, had a population of more than 180,000
during the late thirties.

Established in 1903, the Richmond Times

Dispatch was a Democratic paper with a circulation of approximately
n /r

80,000 just prior to World War II.

From 1903 to 1940 the Times

Dispatch was owned by "a small group in Richmond and Norfolk, which
included Charles P. Hasbrook and Samuel L. Slover."

27

In 1940 the Dispatch

merged with its leading rival, the Richmond News Leader when it was pur
chased by John Stewart Bryan, who was President of the College of

2A

Ayerfs Directory (1939), pp. 932-933; Cappon, Virginia Newspapers,

p. 143.
25

Lenoir Chambers, Salt Water and Printer?s Ink (Chapel Hill, 1967),
pp. 312, 31.5-318, 381-382. Also see W. J. Cash, The Mind of the South
(New York, 1941), p. 340.
26Ayer*s Directory (1939), pp. 934-935; Cappon, Virginia Newspapers,
p. 188.
27

Cappon, Virginia Newspapers, p. 188; Virginius Dabney, former
editor of Richmond Times Dispatch, to author, July 9, 1968.

12

OO
William and Mary from 1934 to 1942.
Virginius Dabney, the editor of the~Times Dispatch from 1936
through 1968, was on the editorial staff of the Richmond paper from
1928 to 1934 and was chief editorial writer for two years thereafter
before becoming editor.

29

Having spent six months in Central Europe

in 1934, Dabney has stated that "I wrote just about all of the editorials
30
on international affairs between 1935 and 1941."~

Although he has be

come considerably more conservative in recent years, Dabney, like Jaffe,
was once a hero among Southern progressives and liberals.

31

Dabney

has been described by the New York Times as "one of the South's
best-known early liberals— a white Virginia aristocrat who publicly
sought decency, dignity and advancement for Negroes before the movement for civil rights took root . . ."

32

President of the American

Society of Newspaper Editors in 1957-1958 and "widely known and respected
in the publishing industry," Dabney in 1948 won the Pulitzer Prize for
editorial writings that publicly attacked Richmond's Jim Crow segregation
policies on buses and street cars and for editorials supporting abolition
of the state poll tax.

33

28

Frank Luther Mott, American Journalism, A History of Newspapers
in the United States through 260 years: 1690 to 1950 (New York, 1950),
p . 664.
29

Overton Jones, present chief editorial writer of the Richmond
Times Dispatch, to author, June 4, 1969.
30

Dabney to author, July 9, 1968.

31

Cash, Mind of the South, p. 340; Ben A. Franklin, "An Early
Backer of Negro Rights Retires as Editor in Richmond," New York Times,
January 5, 1969, p. 66*
32
33

Franklin, "An Early Backer of Negro Rights," p. 66.
Ibid.

13

One of the greatest problems- in analyzing newspaper editorials
is that of trying to determine whether an editorial is in any way
controlled or censored by the ownership of the paer.

Some of the

smaller papers such as the South Boston Halifax Gazette, which had
the same man as publisher, editor, managing editor, business manager-,
and owner, do not raise any questions, of course, as to who shapes the
editorial page.

Likewise, papers with the same person as president

and editor, such as the Alexandria Gazette, leave no doubt about whose
viewpoints are being expressed.

But in cases where there might be

some doubt, when confronted with the question of control, the typical
and expected response of the paper is usually comparable to that of
the present executive editor of the Charlottesville Daily Progress who
asserted that "very little control was exercised over editorials" by
the ownership of the Daily Progress in the thirties.

34

Similarly, Virginius

Dabney contends that he was "not pressured" in his molding of the Richmond
Times Dispatch editorial page.

35

Yet in the same interview in which he asserted that he was "not
pressured," Dabney confessed that had he been able he would have opposed
editorially VirginiaTs "massive resistance" to the 1954 Supreme Court
desegregation decision.

"But not being the owner of the paper, I was

unable to do that," Dabney admitted.

34
35

36

Lindsay B. Mount to author, June 2, 1969.
Quoted by Franklin, "An Early Backer of Negro Rights," p. 66.

■^Quoted in ibid.

14

On such sensitive matters in the South as school desegregation, one
should probably expect some censorship on the part of newspaper owners.
But it is much less likely that there was a great deal of control over
views expressed on world affairs prior to World War II.

Specifically

in regard to the Richmond Times Dispatch, the opinions on international
affairs of Dabney frequently clashed with those of another local
columnist, Thomas Lomax Hunter.

37

The fact that the ownership permitted

these wide differences to appear on the same editorial page would seem
to indicate that there was indeed little or perhaps even "no pressure"
exercised by the paper’s ownership in the thirties regarding affairs
overseas.
In sura, to determine which, if any, of the editorials discussed
in this paper were not the opinions of the editor himself is virtually
impossible.

Fortunately, however, the real sources of the editorials

analyzed in this study are not of primary importance.

Rather the author

is concerned primarily with the generally held thesis among many
historians that the South was the least isolationist section of the
country not only during the Second World War but also during the years
immediately preceding September 1939.

Do editorials in a selected group

of Virginia newspapers seem to demonstrate that the South during the late
thirties was "the most international area in outlook?"

38

37

See, for instance, the differences of opinion expressed by Dabney
and Hunter in the Richmond Times Dispatch on August 31, 1937, p. 6 and
September 5, 1937, p. 2. "As an authority on international affairs," stated
Dabnev, "we regard the ’Cavalier1 [Hunter’s pen name] as something less than
adequate. He knows more about barnyards, coon dogs, woodland lore, and rural
life generally. . ." After defending himself, Hunter sarcastically declared
that at least his column was "not on the New York Times-Manchester Guardian
pipeline."
38
Travis Beal Jacobs, "Roosevelt’s 'Quarantine Speech’," The Historian,
XXIV, No. 4 (August 1962), p. 492. For other comments on the South's
"treasured tradition of internationalism," see also "Victory— And a Shift,"
in Newsweek, June 24, 1957, pp. 30-31.

15

Did the South, as some have argued, really display a more mature and
sophisticated recognition and understanding of world dangers and
foreign affairs that did other parts of the nation?

39

Or do the writings

of Virginia editors indicate that it would be closer to the truth to say
that "isolationism during the thirties . . . w a s a general American
sentiment; not, as sometimes pictured, simply a Midwestern phenomenon
born of the insularity of the American interior"?

AO

Attempts to answer

such questions as these will constitute the bulk of the analytical
sections of this paper.

The author attempts to determine whether the

Virginia editors did or did not share to a considerable degree the
revisionist views, predominantly isolationist viexvs, presented at the
beginning of this introduction.
As Thomas A. Bailey has written, "the term isolation’ has . . .
come to have a sinister connotation, much as a perfectly good word
like ’appeasement* came to have unfortunate implications from having
kept bad c o m p a n y . L a r g e l y because of the bad connotations, one

Among those who have argued along these lines is Virginius
Dabney. ' For example, see his "The South Looks Abroad," Foreign Affairs,
XIX (October 1940), 171-178 and Below the Potomac, A Book about the New
South (New York, 1942), pp. 287-289.
40
Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941 (Ithaca, 1966),
p. 648.
41

Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in the Street: The Impact of American
Public Opinion on Foreign Policy (New York, 1948) , p. 2.40.

16

is likely to obtain unsatisfactory answers to questions regarding the
sentiments of various editors prior to World War II.

For example, the

present executive editor of the Charlottesville Dally Progress has written
of the editor of that paper during the thirties:
.
was an lsolatxoms
t .„42

"I doubt . . . that he

Similarly, the present associate editor of the

Roanoke Times has declared, "I doubt if Mr. Chapman [editor of the
Times during the thirties], whom I knew well, entertained any isolationist
sentiments."

43

Even Virginius Dabney has written that he "was extremely

indignant over the sell-out of Czechoslovakia to Hitler, and the tone
of the editorials at that time was probably isolationist."

But he

hastens to add that "later, we veered around, and . . . became s t r o n g l y
pro-ally and interventionist."^
The only way to discover what the views of the editors were is
to study what they themselves had to write.

Examined in twelve

Virginia papers are the Italo-Ethiopian conflict and the Neutrality
Act of 1935; the China Incident, Rooseveltfs Quarantine Speech, the
Brussels Conference, the Panay Incident, and the proposed Ludlow war
referendum debate of 1937; the Czechoslovakian controversy of 1938;
and the outbreak of World War II in 1939.

By taking into account

editorial views on what were to become the major Axis powers in the
Second World War, Italy, Japan, and Germany; by examining newspapers,
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Mount to author, June 2, 1969.
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Horace Hood III, present associate editor of the Roanoke Times,
to author, August 23, 1968.
44

Dabney to author, July 9, 1968.
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both dailies and weeklies, from all sections of the state; and by
comparing what historians have said about the South as a whole with
what the editors of one Southern state wrote, the author attempts in
the following chapters to draw some conclusions about editorial opinion
in Virginia during the four years immediately preceding Hitler's inva
sion of Poland in the fall of 1939.

CHAPTER 1: ETHIOPIA AND NEUTRALITY

The year 1935 was a very significant one in the coming of World
War II and in American reaction to the coming of the war.

Particular

ly important were the Ethiopian crisis and the passage of the first in
a series of neutrality acts designed to prevent the United States from
being "dragged" into another "European" or "foreign" war.'*'
While United States Congressmen were debating about the details
of neutrality legislation during the summer of 1935, Italy’s dictator
was making plans for a revival of the Roman Empire.
Washington and Rome were by no means unrelated.

The events in

Although Adolf

Hitler and the Japanese warlords undoubtedly played a major role in
creating the first neutrality act, the international crisis foremost
in American thinking during the summer and fall of 1935 was the
impending Italo-Ethiopian war.

The threat of that war coming in the

very year that suspicions of World War I "merchants of death” were

For American reaction to the Italo-Ethiopian war and support
for neutrality legislation, see Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse,
Its Twentieth Century Reaction (New York, 1957), pp. 238-240; Frederick
Lewis Allen, Since Yesterday, 1929-1939 (New York, 1939), pp. 256-260;
James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt : The Lion and the Fox (New York, 1956),
pp. 253-263; DeConde, American Foreign Policy, pp. 567-568; Robert A.
Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent, American Entry into World War II (New
York, 1965), pp. 14-15, 18-28; Donald F. Drummond, The Passing of
American Neutrality, 1937-1941 (Ann Arbor, 1955), Chapter 1, passim;
Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 169-184.
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being confirmed by the Nye Committee, aroused too many memories of
1914 for Americans to leave themselves unprotected.

It was time for

them, as one historian has written, to construct "a storm cellar."

2

Should Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, become another
Sarajevo, Americans in 1935 were determined to reamin aloof.

Further

more, in order not to aggravate the already unstable economy, the
United States must ignore propaganda from overseas and not become the
financier of any belligerent.

The failure of the Europeans to pay

off their debts from the last war caused one great depression.
That was one too many.

This time America must remain fortified be

hind its ocean walls and let the Old World diplomats worry about
Italian imperialism— imperialism which was, incidentally, no worse
than that the leaders of the British and French Empires had practiced
in Africa, India, and other areas of the world in earlier days.
So Congress got busy.

The fruit of its labor, the Neutrality

Act of 1935, was signed by the President on August 31, less than
five weeks before Mussolini's Black Shirts invaded Abyssinia.

The

Act provided "that upon the outbreak or during the progress of war
between, or among, two or more foreign states, the President shall
claim such fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export arms,
ammunition, or implements of war . . . t o any port of such belligerent
states.

2

.

Also the President was given the discretionary power to

Burns, Roosevelt, p. 255.

20

proclaim that "no citizen of the United States shall travel on any
vessel of any belligerent nation except at his own risk."

3

Six

months later the 1935 act was extended for a year with the added pro
vision that loans to belligerents would also be forbidden.

Hence,

the warnings of the Nye Committee were heeded in the form of law.

4

The rather limited amount of space the editors of the Virginia
weeklies devoted to Ethiopia and neutrality in 1935 would seem at
first glance to indicate that their concern about world affairs was
not so great.

One should remember, however, that local and town

affairs dominated most of the space in the x^eeklies even during the
critical pre-World War II years.
The Bedford Democrat questioned the effectiveness of a neutrality
act which failed to make clear specifically what constitutes an imple
ment of war.

In the words of the editor, "wheat is a war supply, no

less than bullets or gunpowder."

Except for a factual account of the

neutrality act in a later editorial, the Democrat gave no further
coverage of the act during 1935.

Similarly, concern over Ethiopia was

limited to a few expressions of hope prior to the invasion by Italy
that the United States would "lend all the moral support possible to
the efforts which the other great nations are making to avert this
silly and senseless war.!'

5

3
Congressional Record, 74 Cong., 1 sess., Aug. 20, 1935, pp.
13795-13796.
4
DeConde, American Foreign Policy, p. 568.
^Bedford Democrat, Sept. 5, 1935, p. 2; Oct. 10, 1935, p. 2.
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The Front Royal Warren Sentinel echoed the Democrat1s concern
over the effectiveness of the neutrality act when it quoted "the
wise chairman of the War Industries Board, Bernard M. Baruch" as
saying that " frighting countries can do without war-gas and machine
guns quicker than without wheat and other food and clothing . . .1
Despite the fears the Warren Sentinel expressed in regard to violations
of the neutrality act by "merchants dealing in war goods," the paper
asserted that "if we have intestinal fortitude to stick by the present
program we will not be drawn into this European mess."

Reminding its

readers of "the great war," the paper stated that "American shipping
interests wanted their profits [then] and got them."7
The Louisa Central-Virginian, an ardent fan of President
Roosevelt ("we have almost come to the conclusion that he can do no
8
wrong" ) and. frequent critic of Senator Byrd ("that esteemed Senator
has never been in a bread line, else he would see things in a different light" ) attacked "the big American newspapers" and the radio
announcers for devoting too much space and time to "war talk" and
emphasized its opposition "to these United States having anything more
to do with Europe, as regards to our taking any part in their affairs.
Once Mussolini had invaded Ethiopia, the Central-Virginian predicted
that "he will meet with disaster."

This prediction was based in large

part on a belief that the League of Nations would act— a belief that

£
Front Royal Warren Sentinel, Oct. 17, 1935, p. 2.
7Ibid.
Louisa Central-Virginian, Feb. 28, 1935, p. 2.
9Ibid., July 4, 1935, p. 2.
^ I b i d . , Mar. 21, 1935, p. 2.
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was not realized as the paper itself acknowledged editorially the next

11
year.
Editorial comment on the Ethiopian conflict in the South Boston
Halifax Gazette was limited to the Armistice Day statement that "it is
encouraging to note . . . that the United States seems determined to
keep out of another conflict, and this determination is in keeping with
the desires of an overwhelming majority of the American people."

12

A quick reading of some of the Williamsburg Virginia Gazette1s
editorials in 1935 might lead the reader to conclude that it was a
strongly isolationist newspaper.

For example, in February it expressed

its "gratification" that the Senate had voted against United States
membership in the World Court thus allowing this country to remain
"a free and independent state."

In regard to war debts owed the

United States, the Gazette contended that this country has "always
gotten the short end of the argument" in its dealings with Europe.

"The

moral would seem to be to keep out of all entanglements and attend
strictly to our own business."

13

Furthermore, the editorfs disillusionment over world irrespon
sibility was voiced frequently in criticisms of treaty violations and
of the League of Nations.

The editor's frustration with world events

was probably most evident when he remarked that "we might as well abandon
all treaties, build a Chinese wall around ourselves and tell the rest
of the world to go hang.

14

After all, it appeared that treaties such

l l I b ± d ., Oct. 10, 1935, p. 2.
12
13

South Boston Halifax Gazette, Nov. 7, 1935, p. 4.

Williamsburg Virginia Gazette, Feb. 1, 1935, p. 2.

14Ibid., July 19, 1935, p. 2.

as the Kellogg Pact were "nothing but a scrap of paper" and that in
their failure to "live up to their solemn obligations" the "christian
and civilized nations of the world . . . [were] lapsing back to barbarism.
This failure to uphold treaties combined with the League's inadequate
"back bone" as reflected in its failure to impose sanctions on oil
against Italy seemed to contribute heavily to the Gazette 's support
for a strict embargo against Italy and Ethiopia on "everything which is
needed by the nations at war."

16

This demand for a strict embargo was

intensified by the belief, undoubtedly influenced by the Nye Committee
investigations, that "munitions manufacturers and greedy, unscrupulous
politicians prefer war and its profits, never counting the cost to the
defenseless ."^7
Despite these statements there is on the part of the Williamsburg
paper an ambivalence that makes it necessary to examine more closely
these apparently isolationist views.

Most isolationists in 1935

appeared to favor a type of neutrality such as that embodied in. the
neutrality legislation of that year which prohibited the exportation of
munitions to either side engaged in a war.

Shortly after Mussolini's

invasion of Ethiopia, however, the Gazette distinguished between
aggressor and victim.

Asserting that "if it is necessary that the

might of the United States is required to preserve the safety of all
nations then we should not shirk the responsibility," the editor urged
that this country sell Ethiopia war munitions and food.

Although he

foresaw "no occasion to send troops," the editor somewhat vaguely

15Ibid., July 12, 1935, p. 2; Sept. 6, 1935, p. 2.
16Ibid., Oct. 4, 1935, p. 2; Nov. 29, 1935, p. 2; Dec. 27,
1935, p. 2.
17Ibid., July 19, 1935, p. 2.
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declared that "an iron ring of steel by the great powers of the world
should encircle the weak that their souls may dwell in peace."

18

Precisely what this protection of the weak would involve is not made
clear, but there can be no mistake that the language is far from
isolationist in tone.
Virginia Gazette's willingness to see the United States
play a role in world affairs is stated more clearly perhaps in the
following extract from an editorial printed in late 1935:
While we want and desire peace, . . . we must take a
stand with the other nations in outlawing war. Our superior
civilization should fit America to be the one to lead. . . .
Until we can show the world and by our example prove that we
are willing to fight for an ideal we will still be in that
backward state which we attribute largely to our forefathers
since Adam.
If the Anglo-Saxon people would get together as
one people and defy aggressive nations with the sword there
would be very little attempt made to provoke hostilities.
Great Britain and America could control the world destinies
if they would, in the cause of peace.19
In sum, the Williamsburg paper was neither consistently isolationist
nor internationalist in 1935.
The viewpoints expressed by the dailies in regard to the problem
of neutrality in 1935 were similar to those presented by the weeklies.
The question of greatest concern about neutrality legislation seemed to
be, as the Alexandria Gazette asked, "What . . .
war?"

20

is an implement of

Apparently desiring to go farther than the neutrality act,

the Gazette inquired:
embroil a world?"

21

"what American wants to see our wheat used to
Despite where American sympathies may lie, the

Alexandria editor urged his readers to keep these questions in mind

^ I b i d . , Oct. 11, 1935, p. 2.
1 9Ibid., Dec. 13, 1935, p. 2.
20

Alexandria Gazette, Aug. 28, 1935, p. 4.
Ibid.
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and not to forget that "we were dragged into the last war by our
emotions."

22

' The editor insisted that "some sort of actual neutrality

could be attained" only by embargoing "raw materials which can be made
into arms or munitions."

23

The Gazette wanted a neutrality act so

clearly defined that there would be no possibility of this country
ever again being confronted with the uncertainties of another

Lusitania incident.

24

It is not surprising, therefore, that the

Alexandria editor asserted later that the "neutrality resolutions
...[went] only a fractional part of the way toward actual neutrality."

25

The Fredericksburg Free Lance Star initially applauded this
country's "strong neutrality law" of 1935 and insisted that "we in
America must stand as a bulwark against a frenzied Europe . .

26

Less than three weeks later, however, after the Italian invasion of
Ethiopia, the editor expressed his fear that the neutrality act and
the President's assurances of non-entanglement would "fall short of
an assurance of real neutrality."

27

Based largely on the likelihood

of this country being affected by war propaganda and economic entangle
ments, the editor's doubts were echoed by several of the other papers.
These doubts will be discussed in more detail in connection with the
Ethiopian struggle, a struggle which the Free Lance Star declared
"is not our fight . . . our concern is to mind our own business."

22

Ibid.

23Ibid., Aug. 24, 1935, p. 4.
24

Ibid., Aug. 26, 1935, p. 4.

25Ibid., Sept. 3, 1935, p. 4.
26

Fredericksburg Free Lance Star, Sept. 19, 1935, p. 6.

27Ibid., Oct. 8, 1935, p. 4.

Ibid.
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Because the Roanoke Times had nothing specific to point out about the
first interwar neutrality act, its feelings about foreign affairs
during 1935 should also await discussion of Ethiopia.
The debate over what constitutes an implement of war did not
cause as much concern to the editor of the Danville Register as it
did to most of the other editors.
do not make war with bread."

In the words of the Register, "people

The editor believed that a broad defini

tion of implements of war that included all exports would create tre
mendous problems in enforcement of the neutrality act and would make
it difficult "to maintain our economic balance if Europe went to war."
The most dangerous impediments that might block true American
neutrality, according to the Register, were industry and finance.
Reminding its readers that "President Wilson, who did not want war,
was swept off his feet by the irresistible demand for it that came
from our war industries," the Register warned that these industries
"have started a chain of events that would lead logically to war."

30

Americans simply must not forget the lessons of history; they must
remember that it was "the munitions manufacturers and their bankers
[who] got us into the World War."

31

It was"the sale of munitions and

the booming war industries [that] gave us no time for anything except
cheers for the minute men who were urging us on into the conflict."
Such attacks against munition industries led the Register to

29

Danville Register, Aug.

22, 1935, p. 4.

3°t^
Ibid.
31Ibld., Oct. 8, 1935, p. 4.
33Ibid., Aug. 25, 1935, p. 4.
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29

27

term the arms embargo section of the 1935 neutrality act "the most
humanitarian procedure."

33

But the Danville paper was by no means

completely satisfied with the neutrality act.

First, the Register

emphasized that:
In addition to our economic safeguards against war we
need safeguards against propaganda . . .
We need also a
commission of social psychologists . . . t o combat propaganda
by explaining its sources and to work out an arrangement to
give them an efficient sounding board in Washington. We need
it, but we will hardly get it from an Administration that is
building the biggest army and navy America ever had.-^
These remarks on propaganda were made in connection with some
comments on Americans’ unquestioning acceptance of World War I "Hun
atrocities" such as the sinking of the Lusitania.
A second objection to the.neutrality act was even more directly
aimed at the administration.
implementation of the act.

This objection dealt with presidential
Specifically, it concerned President

Roosevelt’s statement that supposedly inflexible provisions such as
the mandatory arms embargo might in the end contribute to involving
the United States in a war.

After briefly discussing Woodrow Wilson’s

"He kept us out of war" campaign of 1916, the Register again reminded
its readers of America's gradual entrance into World War I and concluded
that "before [Roosevelt] uses his extraordinary power over Congress to
make [the neutrality act] flexible he owes it to the country to precise35
ly define a ’flexible neutrality resolution.” ’

In brief, it is enough

to state that the Register’s hopes for this country’s
in brewing world crises were far from bright in 1935.

33

Ibid.

^ I b i d . , Aug. 31, 1935, p. 4.
35Ibid., Sept. 3, 1935, p. 4.
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As world crises mounted dux'ing the summer of 1935, the editor
of the Charlottesville Daily Progress also became more and more uneasy
about the susceptibility of the American mind to propaganda.

Ever

aware of 1917, the editor noted that "for three years, Americans have
been deluged itfith the most concentrated anti-Nazi propaganda."

Then

using an argument that became a standard one among many interwar
isolationists, the paper stated that "we should purge ourselves of the
strain of racial [Jewish] oppression before x^e undertake to mind the
business of other people."

36

Once the neutrality act had been passed, the Dally Progress
lost no time in declaring that the arms embargo was not enough, that
it was "a futile little gesture, accomplishing practically no good,
and being in practice merely a discrimination against the manufacturers
of armaments."

Insisting that "the only way we can keep out [of war]

is to boycott all belligerents both as to loans of money and shipments
of goods of all kinds," the Charlottesville paper again looked to the
past and noted that "in 1917, we were not faced with the issue of going
to war or not going to war, but of going to war or facing the most
serious financial and industrial crisis of our history."

Americans

should know by now that "half-way measures will be useless."

37

The Daily Progress added to the Danville RegisterTs condemnations
of the administration’s role in the initiation and implementation of
the neutrality act.

36

Roosevelt, according to the Charlottesville paper,

Charlottesville Daily Progress, Aug. 2, 1935, p.4.

37Ibid., Sept. 4, 1935, p. 4.
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deserved "censure for not including the [neutrality] resolution on
his 'must' list of legislation.

38

Conspiratorial implications as well

as a touch of Anglophobia were evident in the paper’s expressed fear
that the President might not use his power to extend an arms embargo
against Britain should she eventually be drawn into a conflict origin
ating between two other powers.

The President’s discretionary power in

regard to extension of the embargo might "have serious consequences" in
light of the fact that "Mr. Roosevelt has been playing Great Britain’s
game privately for some time."

39

The Daily Progress explained the

manner in which the United States might be drawn into another foreign
war in the following terms:
The chief danger point now . . . is in the Far East.
Once England becomes embroiled in any way on the continent,
it is generally believed that Japan will make a final drive
in China and annex all of the valuable sections of that country . . .
If President Roosevelt is still in the White House, indications
are that he would step in andpolice the Pacific for Great Britain,
an action that would naturally lead to great danger of our being
drawn into a war with Japan.
Of the major state newspapers, the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot was
probably the most consistently non-isolationist.
the neutrality legislation of 1935 was
the plus side,

Its attitude towards

one ofcautiousoptimism.

the neutrality act wasdescribed

as "the

On

mostextensive

effort yet attempted to make neutrality a positive and determining
fact.

,f41
. .

With World War I and the Nye Committee in mind, the Pilot

assertedthat "a world cataclysm would almost certainly draw us into it

OQ

Ibid., Aug. 22, 1935, p. 4.
3^Ibid., Oct. 15, 1935, p. 4.
40-..,'
Ibid.
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Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, Aug. 23, 1935, p. 6.

if the

30

nation relied merely on the old formula of making all the money out of it
that is possible."

A2

On the other hand, the Norfolk editor warned:
of neutrality can surely be achieved by resolution."

"No blueprint
43

Along the same

lines, the Pilot continued two days later, "All that has been accomplish
ed is the initiation of a change in policy, limited as to time and scope,
which should make it somewhat easier to keep out of the fire if it
should not become a general conflagration."44

In short, "it should be

recognized [that] the chances of building a bomb-proof policy are
45

extremely slight."
The Norfolk editor was in agreement with most of the other
state papers (the Danville one being a notable exception) that the
broader the definition of "Implement of war," the greater the chance of
the United States remaining isolated from world conflicts:

"Enlarging

the definition so as to apply the embargo to a large number of com
modities not ordinarily embraced in the implements of war* category,
would .. . . still be the procedure most likely to keep us from being
sucked into the maelstrom."

46

Significantly, during the period of

debate surrounding the first neutrality act, the Pilot never came out
openly for or against a broader definition of war implements.

Unlike

most of the other papers in 1935, the Pilot was unwilling to accept
fully the prevalent belief that this country should never become involved
in another war.

42T, . ,
Ibid.
Ibid.
44Ibid., Aug. 25, 1935, p. 6.
4~*Ibid. , Sept. 3, 1935, p. 6.
46
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The Norfolk p a p e r Ts cautious position is illustrated a bit

better perhaps in the following comment on the impartial arms embargo.
The first word, Lf, deserves special notice.
If it be granted that it is of supreme national importance
to keep out of the next European war even if it means that im
perialism will thereby be aided and the rights of weak peoples
be done a disservice, it is better to begin by avoiding the sale
of war implements to either side, than to risk the graver in
volvements that attend the effort to sell arms to both or to
embargo the sale of arms to one of the belligerents, thereby
directly taking sides in the c o n f l i c t . ^
Hence, it appears that only after whatever was in this country’s

national interest could be proven, was the Virginian-Pilot willing
to take a definite position on neutrality.
Like the Virginian-Pilot, the Richmond Times Dispatch also
acknowledged that "it is by no means certain that . . . any neutrality
resolution . . . would keep the United States from being involved in
a general European war."

48

The Dispatch appeared to consider the two

major blocks to our non-involvement in world crises to be propaganda
and the "merchants of death."
Reviving memories of the "10,000,000 young men who soaked Europe
with their blood . . .

in a wholly futile cause," fhe Richmond editor

declared, "like dumb cattle they were herded into the service in their
respective countries, after being so drugged with propaganda that they
were completely befuddled as to the issues."

49

Because Americans "were

fed a steady stream of government-manufactured lies about the Central
Powers, as soon as Belgium was invaded" in 1 9 1 4 , the Dispatch "firmly
resolved not to credit any atrocity stories about either combatant in
the Italo-Ethiopian

war without

.. . absolutely conclusive proof."3'*'

^ Ibid.,
Aug. 25, 1935, p.6.
48
Richmond Times Dispatch, Aug. 22, 1935, p. 8.
^ I b i d .,

July 2, 1935, p. 8.

3°Ibid.,

Oct. 5, 1935, p. 6.

51Ibid., Oct. 18, 1935, p. 14.
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As for the second possible deterrent to our neutrality, the
Dispatch believed that existing governmental agencies were capable
of handling the munition and armament makers.
"count[ed] on the Munitions Control Board . . .

The Richmond editor
to impose a stringent

definition of 'implements of war* under the neutrality act."

52

When

several munition industries were prosecuted for selling war materials
to the belligerent countries of Bolivia and Paraguay, the Dispatch
applauded the Roosevelt administration and remarked that it was "to
be commended in the highest terms."

53

The tone of the Richmond

editorials on neutrality seems to suggest that that paper was consider
ably more optimistic about the chances of success for the first
neutrality act than were several of the other large state papers such
as the Virginian-Pilot.
In regard to Mussolini's Ethiopian campaign, several common
themes permeated the editorials of most of the dailies:

the Ethiopian

conflict could be another Sarajevo; it was indeed a time of testing
for the League of Nations; the United States must stand firm and resist
any pressures that might drag her into another foreign affair; Britain
was guided primarily by selfish motives to save her vanishing empire;
perhaps the decisions made at Versailles justified to some extent the
actions of Mussolini.
The Alexandria Gazette released some of its Anglophobe and
Francophobe frustrations when it declared that Britain and France were
unwilling "to give up to Italy some of the African lands they

52Ibid., Sept. 29, 1935, p. 2; Oct. 20, 1935, p. 2.
53Ibid., Oct. 20, 1935, p. 2.
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themselves grabbed in the days when that process was not so frowned
upon as now."

54

Although willing to lend moral support to any efforts

employed to block Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, the Gazette emphasized
that "Britain has done in India, South Africa and various other parts
of the world pretty much what Italy is now doing in Ethiopia, and what
Japan,has been doing lately in China."”*”* Furthermore, the Alexandria
paper asserted that since "Italy was cheated" at the end of the world
war, the League should redistribute the African "mandates," "giving
Germany some at least of her colonial property, and giving Italy as
fair a share as Britain and France.

Otherwise there can be no peace."

56

As for the role to be played by the United States, the Gazette maintained
that "it is a guarantee— always provided the American people continue
sane and steadfast— that here, whatever may happen in the Old World,
will be a stronghold of peace.

In no other way can we serve mankind

n »57
so well.
The Fredericksburg Free Lance Star lost little time in drawing
parallels between the threatening Ethiopian situation and the world
war.

As early as July the editor discussed briefly the remote,

little-known center of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and noted that "back
in 1914 there was another place many of us had never heard about—
Sarajevo.

Something happened there— the murder of an archduke— and

you know the rest."

58

In a reference to the Kellogg Pact, the Star

asserted that "II Duce apparently is determined to follow the course
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Alexandria Gazette, Sept. 21, 1935, p. 4.

55Ibid., Nov. 12, 1935, p. 4.
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previously followed by that prince of imperialism, Kaiser Wilhelm, and
reduce all solemn covenants to the status of mere scraps of paper."

59

Before the actual invasion of Ethiopia, the Star declared that
llthe American government, which cannot assume responsibility for the
maintenance of virtue among nations, must keep its hands off."

60

Once

the invasion had begun, the paper instructed its readers that "the
point to be kept in mind . . .

if war involves a great part of Europe,

is that it is not our fight, and that our concern is to mind our own
i •
it61
business.
Yet the Star apparently had little hope that its desires would
be realized.

Again looking at the past and drawing parallels shortly

before the Ethiopian invasion, the Fredericksburg editor contended:
America, today, stands in the same position that it
did in 1914. . . . Will it uphold humanitarian principles by
refusing to sell the provender upon which war feeds? We fear
not. Where there is money to be made the munition makers will
coin it, and there will be paid propagandists to support their
business views.62
The greatest hope the Star appeared to have that this country would
remain at peace was that Americans would not forget what they had
lost in the recent war:

"50,000 young men killed, 200,000 others more

or less seriously wounded, a debt of twenty-two billion dollars of our
own and loans of eleven billions to our allies."

63

Although the Roanoke Times considered the prospects of joint
action by the League of Nations against Italian aggression to be slim,
it predicted that Britain might initiate some action that would deter
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61Ibid., Oct. 8, 1935, p. 4.
62Ibid., Sept. 3, 1935,
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63Ibid., Sept. 4, 1935,
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Mussolini’s forces.

The Times was quick to point out, however, that if

Britain did act, it would be because of her "interests in Ethiopia and

in the adjoining sections of Africa" and that she would be "acting
primarily to protect herself rather than because of any altruistic
,,64

motives.

Insofar as the United States was concerned, the Roanoke paper,
although in sympathy with Ethiopia, asserted that there were few
Americans indeed who would "emulate Great Britain’s course in making
an anti-Italian demonstration . . . .

the American people are unalter

ably and emphatically opposed to intervention in European quarrels and
do not wish their Government to become embroiled in foreign controversies.
Furthermore, the Times insisted that "sympathy for Ethiopia should not
cause Americans to permit themselves to be duped by propaganda intended
to deceive and to arouse feeling against the invaders . . . "

66

Quoting

an editorial published the day before by the Richmond Times Dispatch , ^
the Roanoke paper agreed that "*We were badly buncoed 21 years ago.’"
Therefore, in the words of the Roanoke editor, "Let us think back to
1914 and maintain a skeptical attitude toward vague and unsubstantiated
stories of atrocities charged against either the Italians or the
Ethiopians. . . . L e t ’s not be taken in so easily this time."

68

In an attempt to explain the "psyche of war," the Danville
Register observed:

64
65

"When the bands begin to play man leaps to war

Roanoke Times, Sept. 18, 1935, p. 6.
Ibid., Sept. 27, 1935, p. 6.

66Ibid., Oct. 6, 1935, p. 6.
^ A l s o see pp. 28-29 for another reference to the Richmond
Times Dispatch editorial of Oct. 5, 1935.

68

Roanoke Times, Oct. 6, 1935, p. 6.
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not to make the world safe for democracy or to save his countryTs honor,
but because deep in the human constitution there are primitive passions
and perversities written there during the history of the race as .it came
up from the murk of sub-tropical forests."

69

Such sentiments help to

explain the Register?s support for the neutrality act and its hopes
that the act might be strengthened to include propaganda safeguards.

70

In regard to Ethiopia, the Danville paper was critical of the
League of Nations in general ("it is upholding the White M a n ’s Burden"

71

)

and of Britain in particular (England’s primary interest is always in
her possessions beyond the seas."

72

)

The Register confessed, however,

that "the League of Nations might have been a more vigorous body if
America had been a member."

In the same editorial the Register concluded,

in words difficult to square with the paper's sentiments strongly endorsing
American neutrality, that "our splendid isolation . . .has triumphed.

But

when Africa begins to rumble it will not appear to have been a splendid
. _
,.73
victory.
Of all the newspapers covered in this study, probably the most
adamant in its verbal attacks against European countries, particularly
against Great Britain, was the Charlottesville Daily Progress.

Described

as the "chief exponent" of hypocrisy, Great Britain was condemned by the
Daily Progress for her failure to honor a "secret treaty of 191.5" which
would have given Italy "a protectorate over Abyssinia."7^
69

Any attempt

Danville Register, July 3, 1935, p. 4.

7^See pp. 23-24 for the Danville Register's comments on neutrality.
7*4)anville Register, Aug. 7, 1935, p. 4.
72Ibid., July 10, 1935, p. 4.
73Ibid., Aug. 21, 1935, p. 4.
74

Charlottesville Daily Progress, June 29, 1935, p. 4.
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by England to settle the Ethiopian problem would be based most likely,.
according to the Charlottesville paper, on motives that were "entirely
self-interested."

Why?

In the first place, "the prosperity of British-

controlled, agricultural Egypt depends upon the Nile, which flows
through Abyssinia."

Secondly, "Abyssinia is definitely a British sphere

of influence, . . . for the British . . . are just beginning important
engineering projects there."

Thirdly, "an Italian-controlled Abyssinia

would drive a wedge between North and South African British Colonies
75

and render union between them forever impossible."

To expose even

more "the hypocrisy of England’s moral pretensions with regard to
Ethiopia," the Charlottesville editor declared that "the history of
oppression, brutality, and violence that has characterized the treat
ment of India during the past decade is probably unequalled in all of
the history of Western imperialism."

76

Finally, in reference to

Britain as well as to other members of the League of Nations, the Daily
Progress contended that "certainly the body which unblushingly
apportioned large portions of the earth’s surface and population among
the powers as ’mandates,’ would not hesitate to throw Ethiopia to the
lions for any moral scrupples."77
Almost three months before the Italian army invaded Ethiopia,
the Daily Progress urged that the United States "prohibit loans to
the two countries during their period of preparation for war.

. . .

the fact that fighting has not been started is in a sense, only a

75Ibid., July 3, 1935, p. 4.
76Ibid., Nov. 6, 1935, p. 4.
7 7Ibid., July 18, 1935, p. 4.
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technicality.

. . ."

Despite our sympathies for Ethiopia, "it is

not our war, and we do not want it to become our war."

78

In an

editorial titled "Hot Chestnuts," the Charlottesville paper informed
its readers that any British efforts to involve the United States in
the Ethiopian crisis would be in reality motivated by the ulterior
goal of saving the British Empire,

79

As for American economic inter

ests in Abyssinia, the Daily Progress insisted that "not all the oil
in Ethiopia is worth a single American life."

80

In his frequent refer

ences to World War I, it is apparent that the Charlottesville editor’s
concern over Ethiopia was undoubtedly influenced by his conviction
that "one Armistice Day a year is enough.

. . .

The memory of one

devastating war, for which we are still paying and for which our
children will still be paying many years hence, is sufficient."

81

"A practical diplomatic rule" was suggested by the Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot for determining which countries should go to the aid
of Ethiopia:

"those powers possessed of the more immediate interests

in the threatened area have a more immediate moral obligation to
bestir themselves as friendly intercessors than powers whose primary
interests lie in other sections of the globe."

82

The whole problem was

"brought about by European double-dealing . . . in a very real sense
the Italo-Ethiopian

involvement is theoutcome

bargain.

business of thosewho

It is the

78

Ibid., July

9, 1935,

p. 4.

79Ibid., Oct.

9, 1935,

p. 4.
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of abackstairsEuropean

were in on

Ibid., Sept. 2, 1935, p. 4.
Ibid., Nov. 11, 1935, p. 4.

Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 6, 1935, p. 4.

thebargain

in its
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opening stages— France and Great Britain particularly— to pull the
irons out of the fire and not the United States which had no hand in
it."

83

Any intercession on the part of the United States ’’must be

limited to a tender of its good offices, phrased with careful regard
for the delicacy of the situation. ”8^
Pilot predicted that "should no way be found to halt the
destruction of Ethiopian independence by a great civilized power, a
blow will be dealt to the League of Nations which will leave it permanently maimed."

85

Like the Fredericksburg Free Lance Star, the Pilot

feared that Ethiopia might become another Sarajevo.

86

The Norfolk

editor believed that "the meladroit diplomacy of 1914 may repeat itself,"
largely because of the great number of "political irons in the fire.

France can go only so far against Italy.
far without France."

88

Great Britain can go only so

Consequently, League resistance to Italy will

be slight and war will erupt in Ethiopia.

The Italian invasion had hard

ly started when the Pilot expressed its fear that the conflict might
"light fuses leading into the powder magazines of the great powers."

89

Should the Ethiopian crisis lead to a general conflagration, the
Pilot considered the prospects of the United States non-involvement

83T,.,
Ibid., July 14, 1935, p. 6.
84T,.,
Ibid., July 6, 1935, p. 4.
85Ibid.. July 8, 1935, p. 4.
86Ibid., Sept 4, 1935, p. 6.
Ibid., Sept. 22, 1935, p. 4.
88T..,
Ibid., Sept. 17, 1935, p. 6.
89T..,
Ibid. , Oct. 4, 1935, p. 6.
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to be very slim.

In the words of the editor, "we shall be relatively

safe in our new form of neutrality as long as the East African war is
limited to a two-sided conflict on the Ethiopian plateau.

If it spills

over into Europe, . . . only a miracle will keep us from being driven
into a state of belligerency ourselves."

90

It was apparent that the

cautious optimism the Pilot expressed earlier in regard to the neutrality
act had become even more cautious once MussoliniTs troops marched into
Ethiopia.
Permeating practically all of the editorials of the Richmond
Times Dispatch during the weeks preceding and immediately following
the Italian invasion in October were numerous parallels between the
situation then and as it existed in 1914.

The Richmond editor considered

"the role of Ethiopia in the present crisis . . . not unlike that of
Serbia in the crisis of 1914.

Mussolini has been bullying . . . the

Ethiopians, just as Count Berchtold of Austria did the Serbians 21
years ago. . . .

Austria-Hungary regarded herself as culturally superior

to Serbia, and Italy is similarly contemptuous of the Ethiopians today."
Like the Norfolk Virginian—Pilot, the Dispatch agreed that "it is clear
ly up to Britain and France to take drastic action, if they wish to
preserve the peace and keep the League of Nations afloat."

But again

with the past vividly in mind, the Richmond editor continued, "Britain
alone, as in 1914, apparently has it within her grasp to fend off the
approaching catastrophe.

If she had announced in early July, 1914, that

she would be found at France’s side, in the event of a German offensive
through Belgium, that offensive might never have been launched."
90

92

Ibid., Oct. 10, 1935, p. 6. See pp. 26-28 for the Norfolk
Virginian Pilot’s comments on neutrality.
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Richmond Times Dispatch, Aug. 23, 1935, p. 10.

92Ibid., Aug. 16, 1935, p. 12.
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The Dispatch's references to the past continued when it commented
on an attempt by Emperor Haile Selassie to obtain aid from Britain and
the United States in exchange for concessions to commercial and industrial
interests, particularly oil interests:

"This country has not the remotest

intention of pulling the chestnuts of the Standard Oil Company out of the
fire.

It was badly burnt on at least one previous occasion when the

commercial and financial involvement of its banks and industries with
the Allied cause was one of the major factors x^hich brought it into the
World War."

At least in this particular case the Dispatch conceded that

it was in agreement with Senator William E. Borah, Senator Hiram W.
Johnson, and "other members of the ultra-isolationist bloc in Congress."

93

The extent to which the United States should cooperate with the
League of Nations, according to the Richmond paper, xrould be to refuse
94
"credits and raw materials" to Italy.
Although the Dispatch asserted
that "the league may not be for us, removed as we are by geography and
history from the tangled boundaries and polyglot populations of Europe,"
it did predict shortly before the Italian invasion that that international
body "can be a powerful instrument of peace."

95

Within two weeks, hox^-

ever, the Dispatch saw that the lack of cooperation on the part of
League members made it highly unlikely that sanctions against Italy
would be effective.

93

96

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Richmond

Ibid., Sept, 1, 1935, p. 2.

9AIbid., Aug. 22, 1935, p. 8.
9^Ibid., Sept. 28, 1935, p. 6.
96Ibid., Oct. 11, 1935, p. 14.
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editor was soon urging this country to guard itself against atrocity
stories and "the merchants of death" despite what safeguards might be
offered by the neutrality legislation.

97

In a detailed analysis of American isolationism during the six
years prior to Pearl Harbor, Manfred Jonas observed:
the Italo-Ethiopian War fitted neatly into the isolationists1
concept of foreign wars and their relation to the United States.
The United States had no territorial and only slight economic
interests in Africa. Though Mussolinifs action was clearly
aggressive and unprovoked, it seemed little different from what
Great Britain and France had been doing in Africa for nearly a
century . . . . ItalyTs attempt to gain a colony [in Ethiopia]
appeared to be an effort to redress legitimate grievances stemming
from the First World War and a necessary step toward relieving
dangerous internal population pressures. . . .
The isolationists were certain, therefore, that the United
States had no reason
to become involved in the conflict, either
for practical or formoral reasons. They were not prepared to
admit that the Neutrality Act was unnecessary to insure American
non-involvement in this instance, and showed great concern about
the'unequal effects of the law on the tx^o belligerents. As a con
sequence, they intensified their search for means to improve
existing^Iegislation in order to provide genuine American neutrality
in future' conflicts.
The most logical step in this direction x<ras a
mandatory embargo on
strategicmaterials other than arms ammunition,
to take effect immediately upon the outbreak of war anyxtfhere in the
world .98
With somewhat more stress on the Anglophobia and a f e w comments
on the demands for propaganda safeguards, Jonas’s summation of how "the
Italo-Ethiopian War fitted neatly into the isolationists' concept of
foreign wars” accurately depicts the sentiments, generally speaking, of
the Virginia editors.

As a whole, the editors advocated a type of

neutrality supported by those who have been labeled "timid isolationists":
those who "were prepared to surrender some traditional rights in order

97Ibid.,

Oct. 18, 1935, p. 14; Oct. 20, 1935, p. 2.

98
Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 174-175.
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to minimize direct contact with foreign nations at war and thus avoid
entanglements."

99

Unlike the "belligerent isolationists" such as

Senators Borah of Idaho

and Johnson of California who "were fully pre

pared to defend American [neutral] rights and [shipping] interests,”
the timid isolationists such as Senators Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota
and Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan were anxious to revive "a concept
of neutrality that dated back to the presidency of Thomas Jefferson:
that the main objective of foreign policy in wartime should be to stay
out of the conflict rather than maintain arbitrary rights.
The "timidity" of the Virginia editors was most clearly demonstrated
in their frequent criticisms of the failure of the 1935 Neutrality Act to
go beyond the impartial arms embargo.

The editors believe that merely

prohibiting "implements of war" trade with belligerent countries was
not enough to insure this country*s avoidance of war.

That the opinions

of the Virginia editors were probably indicative of those of Southerners
as a whole is supported by one of George Gallup's first public opinion
polls.

Taken on October 19, 1935, less than two months after the signing

of the Neutrality Act and during the early stages of the Italo-Ethiopian
conflict, Gallup's pollsters asked a cross-section of the American people:
'‘What steps . . . should America take to remain neutral— prohibit all
trade with nations at war; prohibit trade in war materials only; place
no restrictions on trade?"

In only two sections of the country did more

than fifty per cent of the people polled, fifty-two per cent in each
section to be exact, respond that the United States should prohibit all
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Ibid., p . 35.

^^ I b i d ., pp. 35-65; Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, p. 239.
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trade with belligerents.

These two sections, the West Central and the

Southern states, were dissatisfied also with prohibiting trade in war
materials only; just slightly more than a third of the Americans in
those states considered the provisions of the Neutrality Act regarding
"implements of war” to be sufficient.
Of the twelve Virginia papers, only the Danville Register approved
editorially restricting nothing more than war materials to belligerents
and only the Williamsburg Virginia Gazette advocated selling war
munitions and food to Ethiopia.

Memories of Wilson’s Great Crusade

were simply too close and too powerful to be ignored in 1935.

That

they would serve as guide posts to carry the United States through
the crises of the 1930’s was the unmistaken hope of not a few Virginia
newspaper editors.

True, there was some apprehension that was demonstrated

best by the editor of the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot.

Yet, the views of the

editors as a whole appear to be representative of those of most
Southerners as expressed in Gallup’s polls.

If such is the case, Alexander

DeConde's observation seems to hold true, at least in regard to 1935, that
’’before 1938 the South . . . placed a greater value on neutrality than did

^ ,

other sections of the country.
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^^Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, eds., Public Opinion, 1935-1946
(Princeton, 1951), p. 122.
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Alexander DeConde, "The South and Isolationism,”
Southern History, XXIV (August 1958), 334.
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CHAPTER 2:

THE CHINA INCIDENT AND ITS AFTERMATH

The clashes between Japanese and Chinese troops near Peiping
in July 1937 paved the way for months of considerable editorial comment
ary by the dailies reflecting again their bitter memories of the past
and deep concern for the future.

The undeclared Sino-Japanese war, re

ferred to by the Japanese as the "China Incident," had an impact on the
United States that was evident in RooseveltTs Quarantine Speech, the
futile Brussels Conference, the Panay incident, and the fate of the
proposed Ludlow amendment.^
Two months before the outbreak of the war between China and
Japan, Congress passed a third "permanent" neutrality act which
included the main provisions of the 1935 and 1936 temporary acts.

For American foreign policy during the last half of 1937
see Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, pp. 242-245; Allen, Since
Yesterday, pp. 258-260; Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of
the American People (New York, 1964), pp. 704-706; Burns, Roosevelt,
pp. 318-324; DeConde, American Foreign Policy, pp. 570-572; Divine,
Reluctant Belligerent, pp. 39-43; Drummond, Passing of Neutrality,
pp. 51-64; Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 158-167; William L,
Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolationism, 1937-1940
(New York, 1952), pp. 11-25; William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D.
Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York, 1963), pp. 226-230.
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Two new provisions were added:

one made it mandatory for the President

to declare it illegal for Americans to travel on belligerent ships and
the second placed the sale of American goods to belligerents on a "cash
and carry*1 basis, thus lessening the possibility that United States ships
on the seas might involve this country in another war.

2

Despite the protection offered by this legislative wall, the re
newed hostilities in the Far East could not be ignored completely.

Be

cause American sentiment was largely pro-Chinese, President Roosevelt
refused to invoke the neutrality act on the technical grounds that no
war had been declared.

Just as invoking the act in the undeclared war

between Ethiopia and Italy was intended to help the North African nation,
Roosevelt’s reversal of that policy two years later was meant to help
China which was in much greater need of American shipments of munitions
than was Japan.

3

Nevertheless, United States policy towards the crisis

was designed to make "no direct effort to solidify relations with either
China or Japan.”

Principles were reiterated by the State Department to

demonstrate American opposition to specific Japanese violations of
United States rights, but nothing else was forthcoming for many months.
Yet by the fall of 1937 at least the President appeared to feel
that this country’s official position of impartiality was in need of
revision.

Although the motives behind Roosevelt’s famous Quarantine

Speech at Chicago on October 5, 1937, are still debated
2
Congressional Record, 75 Cong., 1 sess., Jan. 26, 1937, pp.
413-414.
3
DeConde, American Foreign Policy, p. 570.
4
Drummond, Passing of Neutrality, p. 53.
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by historians,"* there can be no doubt that the tone of that speech
marked a clear departure from the isolationist tones permeating most of
his earlier foreign policy speeches.
before October 5
of

Typical of the President’s speeches

was the onehe made on the eve of the Italian invasion

Ethiopia when he declared that "the American people can speak but

one sentiment— despite what happens in continents overseas, the United
States shall and must remain, as long ago the Father of our Country
prayed it might remain,uhentangkd

and free."^

Almost a year later

during the 1936 Presidential campaign, Roosevelt again reassured
isolationists by asserting:

"We shun political commitments which

might entangle us in foreign wars; we avoid connection with the political
activities of the League of Nations.

...

We are not isolationists

except insofar as we seek to isolate ourselves completely from war."^
In light of these remarks, it is understandable why many Americans
were opposed to or confused by Roosevelt’s statement at Chicago that:
When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread,
the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the
patients in order to protect the health of the community
against the spread of the disease. . . .
Most important of all, the will for peace on the part
of peace-loving nations must express itself to the end that

The usual interpretation, such as that of Langer and Gleason in
Challenge to Isolationism, is that the President had in mind some extreme
form of sanctions to impose against Japan; another scholar, Dorothy Borg
suggests that Roosevelt was not thinking of taking a hard line against
totalitarian states but rather he was making a "groping attempt" to dis
cover some peaceful means of averting war. See her "Notes on Roosevelt’s
’Quarantine' Speech," Political Science Quarterly, LXXII (September 1957),
405-433.
^Quoted by Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, p. 243.
^Quoted by Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolationism, p. 17.

nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and
the rights of others will desist from such a course. There
must be positive, endeavors to preserve peace. . . Therefore,
America actively engages in the search for peace.®
Even Secretary of State Cordell Hull "vehemently protested the
9

implications of the ’quarantine1 passage."
The strong outpouring of isolationist opposition to the Quarantine
Speech prompted the President to say later that "it’s a terrible thing
to look over your shoulder when you are trying to lead— and to find no
I
one there."
Roosevelt apparently believed, as Abraham Lincoln once
put it, that "public opinion in this country is everything.

In

response to questions by the press a day after the Chicago speech,
Roosevelt definitely backed down when he declared that his speech
might be considered an expansion rather than a repudiation of neutrality.
Despite the efforts Roosevelt made to appease the isolationists,
their ire was aroused again a few days later when it was announced that
the United States would participate in a meeting to be held at Brussels
in November.

Although other powers would be represented, it was hoped

that the main participants would be the signatories of the 1922
Nine-Power Treaty, a treaty by which the contracting powers, including
Japan, agreed "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the
g

Congressional Record, 75 Cong., 2 sess., Appendix, pp. 20-21.
9
Donald F. Drummond, "Cordell Hull," in An Uncertain Tradition:
American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, Norman A,
Graebner, ed. (New York, 1961), p. 200.
"^Quoted by Leuchtenburg, Roosevelt and the New Deal, p. 226.
^ Quo t e d by David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered, Essays on the
Civil War Era (New York, 1956), p. 142.
12

Burns, Roosevelt, p. 319.
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territorial and administrative integrity

of China."

13

The refusal

of Japan to participate combined with the Secretary of State’s admission
to the Japanese ambassador prior to the conference that the United
States contemplated no action virtually foredoomed the Brussels Conference to failure.

14

Nevertheless, with United States participation in

the Conference coming on the heels of the Chicago speech and with no
knowledge of Hull’s statement to the Japanese ambassador, Americans
naturally were suspicious.
Folloitfing the collapse of the Nine Power Conference in
mid-November, less than a month passed before the bombing and sinking
in clear daylight of the United States gunboat Panay by the Japanese
in the Yangtze River on December 12, 1937.

Although two Americans

were killed and thirty wounded, a prompt apology and agreement by
Japan to pay reparations of more than two million dollars settled the
crisis by Christmas, thus demonstrating dramatically this country's
determination to avoid war.^^
Perhaps the most extreme attempt to prevent American entry
into another war was that represented in the proposed Ludlow referendum.
This proposal was designed to reduce the chances for executive irresponsi
bility in foreign policy by forbidding the President from leading a
divided public into war once again.

Briefly, the Ludlow policy sought

a constitutional amendment requiring the approval by a majority of the
American people in a referendum, except in the case of a direct attack,
before there could be a declaration of war.

13

The first such proposed

Congressional Record, 67 Cong., 1 sess., Mar. 30, 1922, p. 4760.

14
Drummond, Passing of Neutrality, pp. 54-55.
^^Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 705.
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constitutional amendment was introduced by Senator Thomas P. Gore of
Oklahoma in 1917 just four months after America’s entry into World War I.
But "the most consistent and energetic advocate of such proposals" was
Representative Louis Ludlow of Indiana who introduced his war referendum
proposal in 1935.

Bogged down in committees for more than two years,

Ludlow’s proposal was given some impetus by the threat of the Panay, but
oh January 10, 1938, the House refused by the close vote of 209 to 188
to consider and discuss the proposal.

The events in the

16

Far East from July 1937 until the end of the

year were discussed in some detail by all but three of the twelve
Virginia editors.

Three of the weeklies, the Front Royal Warren

Sentinel, the Louisa Central Virginian, and the South Boston Halifax
Gazette, devoted not one line to editorial comment on "the Chinese crisis
and American reactions to it.

One must wait until 1938 when Hitlerism

became more threatening and when Britain and France appeased Germany at
Munich to discover the sentiments of these three newspapers on the
coming of World War II.
By the fall of 1937, the Bedford Democrat was questioning serious
ly the value of this country’s "rigid neutrality legislation" which
seemed only to confirm for the world’s dictators that "the United States
need not be considered as a factor in world affairs."^

Continuing in

the same vein in what may have been a response to Roosevelt’s Quarantine
Speech, the Democrat asserted that "words,whether

in public speeches

or in diplomatic notes,

is doubtful if the

will not stop Japan and it

^Jonas, Isolationism in America, pp. 159, 162-163.
^Bedford Democrat, Sept. 16, 1937, p. 2.
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nations have any idea of adopting other tactics."

18

Also in reference

to the Sino-Japanese war, the Bedford paper early the next year de
clared that "there was a time when nations went to war over broken treaties.
There was a day when strong and self-reliant powers, having given protec
tion to weaker people, were resolute enough to stick to their word.
day, it seems, is not to be found in 1938."

19

That

Yet the Democrat appeared

willing to adhere to the policy of this country setting a good example
for the rest of the world:

"possibly, if this country, in its contacts,

demonstrates its purpose of peaceful development, the lesson may not be
lost upon nations that seem inclined to try the sword."

Still, however,

the United States must permit "no weakness in defense to permit unscrupu
lous adventurers to take advantage of our good will . . . .

we must be

abundantly able to enforce proper respect for the rights that belong
to this nation."

20

During the fall and winter of 1937 the editor of the Williamsburg
Virginia Gazette at least wrote as if he wanted the United States to
play a more active role in world affairs.

He stated that "if civiliza

tion and the Christian religion are to survive, the English speaking
peoples of the world must also unite together and when fully and completely ready, drive the Italians and the Japs into the sea . . . "

21

Specifically in regard to the Nine Power Treaty, the Virginia
Gazette affirmed that "if we sign treaties we must stand by our

18

Ibid., Oct. 21, 1937, p. 2.

19Ibid., Feb. 3, 1938, p. 2.
2°Ibid., Mar. 31, 1938, p. 2.
21

Williamsburg Virginia Gazette, Nov. 12, 1937, p. 2.

promise, or forever be despised by-civilized nations.
left for us to do all neutrality laws to the contrary."

There is nothing
22

Shortly

after the collapse of the Brussels Conference and the failure of such
countries as the United States, Britain, and France to display their
"backbone," the Williamsburg paper asked, "Why enter into any treaty
if it is not to be kept?"

23

Later, in a reference to the sale of scrap

iron to Japan by American business firms, the Virginia Gazette asserted
that "a good strict neutrality law is what is required, if not a
national boycott against outlaw countries.

Nothing else seems to be

effective, as treaties are no longer sacred or even worth the paper
they are written on.

The same applies in a similar degree to the League

of Nations, the World Court and Peace Conferences.

,,24

The Virginia Gazette Ts reaction to the Panay incident and this
country’s handling of it was sharp and rather bitter:

"If any nation

had dared to insult America in this manner in the days when the battle
ship Maine was sunk by the Spaniards, or even in Woodrow W7ilsonTs time,
there would have been stiff reprisals and no excuses would have been re
plied to or accepted, except with a barrage of shot and shell in the
aggressors’ own front yard."

The Williamsburg paper somewhat belatedly

asserted that "all symptoms of wilful aggression should be nipped in
the bud . . . "

The paper felt the best retaliatory action for the

"civilized nations" to take would be an economic boycott against Japan
backed by the force of arms.

And "if the President is afraid to issue

an ultimatum against trade with Japan we have enough red blooded

22Ibid., Oct. 15, 1937, p. 2.
2^Ibid_. , Nov. 26, 1937, p. 2.
24
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Americans to refuse to handle Japanese goods."

25

Virgitiia Gazette considered the proposed Ludlow war referendum
to be both dangerous and ill-timed— -dangerous because "it would keep those
in authority from preparing to take steps to avert war or to prepare for
war until it had the sanction of 20 million American electors" and
ill-timed "in its weakening of the President’s message to Japan over
the Panay ’incident.1"

26

Within two months, however, the Williamsburg

editor demonstrated a dramatic reversal in his attitude towards the
United States’ acceptance of the Japanese apology for the bombing of
Panay :

"this country would suffer other insults and losses with

out going to war about it.

This is a Christian civilization as we

know it in a democratic country.

It is not a sign of weakness but

rather, a sure sign of strength in the nation’s character and in the
character of the men who run the affairs of the nation."

27

As in 1935

consistency was not to be found in 1937 on the editorial page of the
Virginia Gazette.
The immediate reaction of the Alexandria Gazette to the China
Incident came in an editorial titled "Asia for Asiatics."

Insisting

that "self-defense today is China’s job," the Gazette reminded its
readers that this country’s past efforts to treat China as "a sort of
benevolent protectorate" were given little support by Great Britain
and others and that "the obvious candidate" for external help was

25 Ibid., Dec. 17, 1937, p. 2.
26 Ibid., Jan. 7, 1938, p. 2.
27 Ibid., Mar. 4, 1938, p. 2.

Russia.

The Alexandria editor advised Americans in China to return

home for "here is a great isle of safety in a violent and crazy
world."

29

As for Americans who were killed or injured in the danger zone,

.■

s.

the Gazette felt that there was "too much tension" for our government
"to take offense and demand punishment for any infraction, no matter'
how small, of the technical rules for protection of citizens. . . .
with all due sympathy for the families that have suffered this loss,
it may be taken as a lesson to other Americans [to get out]."

30

And

as if to leave absolutely no doubt, the Alexandria paper asserted
shortly before the Panay incident that "there is nothing in or near
Asia that Americans today would fight for."

31

In light of these sentiments, the Gazette’s endorsement of
Representative Ludlow’s proposed war referendum amendment as a "sound
proposal" comes as no surprise.

"A defensive, domestic war," declared

the editor, "is probably the only kind of war in which we should ever
engage.

n32

Refraining from any discussion of the Quarantine Speech and
the Brussels Conference, the Alexandria editor reflected on the mistakes
of the past and concluded that "for any lasting peace, these Fascist
nations that are making the trouble must have better access to new
territory and raw materials.

The great land-owning powers must disgorge

28
Alexandria Gazette, July 21, 1937, p. 4.
29 Ibid., Aug. 24, 1937, p. 4.
30 Ibid., Aug. 28, 1937, p. 4.
31 Ibid. , Dec. 2, 1937, p. 4.
32Ibid., Oct. 13, 1937, p. 4.
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some of their World War loot. ■ There must be.a reasonable sharing of
natural resources."

Because."the world is big and rich enough for

all," there must be "a new deal
The first reaction of the

in land and material resources."

33

Gazette tothe Panay crisis appeared

to be a reversal of that newspaper's earlier recommendations that the
United States withdraw from the

Far East.

editor that "the people of this

country do not want peace at any

price.

It was. the opinion of the

We . . . always will fight in defense of the lives of our

countrymen and th“e honor of our nation."

In no uncertain terms the

Gazette asserted that "the time has come when we must prove to the
world that the stars and stripes still stands for, life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness.

There can be only one answer that Japan will

understand and we express the hope that our President x^ill give her a
dose of her own medicine."

34

Within two weeks, however, the Alexandria

paper was content that the United States had emerged "successfully"
from

the Panay incident

primarily because we

compelling Japan's respect."

"possessed anavalstrength

35

Even more frequently than the Alexandria Gazette, the Fredericksburg
Free Lance Star also encouraged United States non-involvement in the
China Incident.

Recognizing that attempts to reason with Japan had failed,

the Star declared that "our first duty is to remove to safety those
36
Americans who are in the zone of hostilities . . ."

~^ I b i d ., Oct. 14, 1937, p. 4§ Oct.

23, 1937, p. 4.

34 Ibid., Dec. 20, 1937, p. 4.
35 Ibid. , Jan. 3, 1938, p. 4.
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A month before the Brussels Conference was to meet, the Star
noted prophetically that it "can amount to little more than a pious
gesture unless the participating nations, including the United States,
are prepared to resort to araed force in the application of their
principles."

Yet the Fredericksburg editor made clear that he felt:

The danger of a too ready acceptance on
Uncle Sam of the role of moral censor is that
entanglements may thereby be created, just as
created as a result of the Wilsonian policies
and 1917.

the part of
embarrassing
they were
between 1914

Under existing world conditions, America’s basic aim
should be that of avoiding the road to war. The sheer futil
ity of ethical action within international affairs was clear
ly shown in the events that culminated in the Versailles
Treaty. What is happening in the Orient should not be allowed
to erase this poignant memory from the mind of official Washington.3?
That the Fredericksburg editor became jittery over the Quarantine
Speech was evident in his contention that "the United States should
guard against a too easy acceptance of the role of moral stooge for
other powers. . . .

Up to now the Roosevelt administration has merely

endorsed action taken by the League of Nations, and . . .

this kind of'

cooperative aid should constitute the limit of our verbal interference
in the Far Eastern conflict."

To further demonstrate his concern over

the Chicago speech, the history-conscious editor stated that "events
leading up to American participation in the World War are the stern
reminder of the dangers entailed in the repeated enunciation of
high-sounding moral principles.

The debtor nations of Europe should

not be allowed craftily to maneuver us into comparable entanglements

37Ibid., Oct. 13, 1937, p. 6.
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with respect to Oriental affairs."

38

Despite their ethical appeals,

the American people should "have no desire to press their own conception
of international morals, however noble, at the point of the sword."

39

The influence of the Sino-Japanese war on many Americans’ in
creasing distrust of Europe was reflected in the Fredericksburg editor’s
comments on the failure of the Brussels Conference.

Fearing that the

European powers might blame the United States for any lack of future
moves against Japan, the Star declared that that would be "the same
kind of European technique which was employed after the Versailles
treaty.

Uncle Sam, having donated the bulk of

themoneyneeded

Allied victory, was blamed for the impotenceof the League

for an

ofNations

and branded as a Shylock for trying to collect the war debts.

It all

makes one feel that this country might just as well forget the international
arena, concentrate on American defense and let Europe stew in its own mess."
Not even the Panay affair shook the Star’s determination to see
this country remain free from world conflicts.

After observing that

such an incident "was bound to happen sooner or later in the Japanese
invasion of China," the Fredericksburg paper expressed its relief that
the American people were not regarding the crisis as a "provocation to
war.”

41

The best safeguard for this country, according to the Star in

an editorial titled "We are Safe While Strong," was the continuation of

38 Ibid., Oct.

15, 1937, p. 4.

39 Ibid., Oct.

20, 1937, p. 6 .
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our preparedness program, for "a strong nation commands respect abroad
and is the least likely to become involved in war.
words of Theodore Roosevelt,

We should, in the

A2
Tspeak softly and carry a big stick.1"

Although the Roanoke Times sympathized with the Chinese and even
acknowledged that "there’s something gravely wrong with a world which
permits such unspeakable wrongs to go unpunished," it maintained that
the Sino-Japanese war "is not our war and we have no business taking
sides."42

By December 1937 the Times acknowledged that there was little
likelihood of "sterner measures than mere verbal protests" forthcoming
against Japan from Washington and London.

44

Largely because of this,

the Roanoke paper believed that -"the Chinese would be wise to capitulate
without delay.

There is nothing to be gained by further resistance."

45

Even after the conflict in the Far East was brought closer to America
with the sinking of the Panay, the Times, although conceding that
"there is a limit to patience," refused to back down from its firm belief that "this country is in no mood to engage in a foreign war."

46

In its only reference to Roosevelt’s Chicago speech, the Roanoke paper
a few days before the Panay incident had implied that it supported a
quarantine of Japan in the form of an economic boycott.

47

Two days after

42 Ibid., Dec. 29, 1937, p. 4.
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Roanoke Times, Nov. 1, 1937, p. 6 ; Dec. 1, 1937, p. 6 .
Ibid., Dec. 5, 1937, p. 6 .

45 Ibid., Dec. 8 , 1937, p. 6 .
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the American gunboat was attacked, the Times extended its undeniable
support for "an immediate and effective embargo against any importations
from Japan into the United States."

48

To that extent the Roanoke paper

felt the United States should go in its opposition to Japan.
Before the end of 1937 the Roanoke editor’s rather mild initial
reactions to the Panay crisis hardened somewhat.

In an editorial titled

"Warning to Japan," the editor declared that "Japan must not count too
heavily upon the desire of the United States and Great Britain to remain
at peace. . . .

neither is afraid to fight if need be, and assuredly

neither is afraid to fight Japan."

49

Finally, the Times described

the proposed Ludlow amendment as "a'nonsensical and dangerous measure"
largely because "the people cannot possibly know the details about
delicate foreign relations.

Within two more weeks, however, the

Roanoke paper appeared satisfied that this country’s acceptance of
Japan’s apology was a wise act of restraint and not of cowardice.
In the early stages of the war between China and Japan, it
seemed "most unlikely" to the Danville Register "that this country
could be drawn into the Sino-Japanese conflict . . ."

52

This state

ment might be attributed in large part to the Register’s faith in
Americans’ learning

from the past:

before in trying to

preserve the balance ofworld sanity

48 Ibid., Dec.

49

hadotherbitterexperiences

14, 1937, p. 6

Ibid., Dec.

23, 1937, p. 6 .

5 °Ibid», Dec.

18, 1937, p. 6 .

51Ibid., Jan.
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"Wehave

Danville Register, Sept. 8, 1937, p. 4.

andwe

have

been left to hold the bag on more than one occasion."

53

Probably most

important was the Danville editor’s contention that because of the numerous
flagrant and open violations of treaties since the World War, the United
States "can hardly be expected to assume the quixotic role of savior of
the oppressed under the terms of a nine-power treaty ."34
Apparently heartened by the QuarantineSpeech,
a rather abrupt change of tone on the part of

there soondeveloped

theDanville

editor.

With

out voicing any criticism, the Register reported that Roosevelt’s
"stern warning . . .

indicates that this government has reached the

definite conclusion that something stronger than neutrality legislation . .
is needed to halt the carnage, the careless flow of human blood in
China ."33

Advocating "a ’quarantine*

[in the form of an economic boycott]

of Japan by the League of Nations with the United States in full cooperation
the Register, in a specific reference to the Nine Power Treaty, asserted
that this country "does not intend that the peace treaties to which it is
56
a signatory shall become merely ’scraps of paper. ’"
The slight hopes expressed by the Danville paper in October again
changed to gloom in November when the editor predicted that "with the
dismal collapse of the

Brussels conference, andwithit the

the peace-loving nations to end

thecarnage, thereseems

hopes of
to be now no

earthly power that can prevent the complete subjugation of China by Japan .

53 Ibid., Sept. 22, 1937, p.

6.
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33 Ibid., Oct. 7,
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The initial reaction of the Register to the bombing of the
Panay was probably more belligerent than that of any of the other
Virginia newspapers examined in this study.

Recalling past wars, the

Danville paper declared, "There was no question concerning responsibility
in the marine incidents that led to war in 1812 and 1917.

There is no

uncertainty about the manner in which the Panay was sent to the bottom
of the Yangtze river."

58

Asserting that "national honor and prestige

require that we see this thing through, come what may," the Register
believed that Washington should "deal with Japan as it would with any
other murderer."

59

In sum, the Danville paper contended that "America

will not hesitate if Japan, or any other power, forces war upon her."

60

It was in the midst of the Panay controversy that the Register voiced
its opinion that the Ludlow resolution was "unwise" because "America,
like other nations that are hated by totalitarian states, needs
must be ready for war at all times, to be sure of her defensive might."
In the end, though, the Danville paper was content with the "amicable
settlement" reached between Japan and the United States:

"Only the

war-mongers," declared the Register, ", . . find disappointment in
the . . . settlement."
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The first reaction of the Charlottesville Daily Progress to the
China Incident was that "while proper protection of our nationals and
our commerce in the Far East is of prime importance, there is

58 Ibid.,

Dec. 14, 1937, p. 4.
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little the United States could gain even by victory in such an affair . . ."

63

Such a statement helps to explain the Daily Progress?s reaction to the
Quarantine Speech in a lengthy editorial titled "Ominous Outlook."

Asserting

that there were "uncomfortable inferences" to be drawn from the speech,
particularly from the section in which the President referred to the need
for "a concerted effort" on the part of "peace-loving nations" to oppose
treaty violations, the Charlottesville paper feared that "this is mani
festly a declaration that America’s greatest assurances of continued
peace— isolation and neutrality— are in jeopardy."

The editor believed

that "the ’concerted effort* can mean only that a military alliance is
contemplated to enforce by power what the League of Nations has most in
effectually endeavored to enforce by moral suasion."

In light of past

experience and particularly in light of our recent relations with
Britain, a military alliance would be especially dangerous:

"By adroit

diplomatic maneuvers, financial dealings and propaganda England was a
prime factor in inducing American entry into the World War . . . And
now England, with tremendous interest in the current situation which
endangers her far-flung empire, would seem reluctant to war on her own
account; she would invite support of the United States."

The simple

conclusion of the Daily Progress was that "it is entirely possible that
another war is ’just around the corner. ’" ^
What one would expect to be the reaction of the Charlottesville
paper to the proposed Ludlow amendment came in a discussion of two
similar resolutions introduced in the Senate.

63
64

To the Daily Progress

Charlottesville Daily Progress, Aug. 4, 1937, p. 4.
Ibid. , Oct. 6, 1937, p. 4*
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the alternatives were simple:

"The Senate is confronted with the

question of whether it desires to retain the arbitrary authority to
declare foreign wars or trust the public enough to invest it with
power."

In the editor’s words , "if the public has sense enough to

elect Congressmen it should be qualified to pass on the matter of
declaring war."

65

These comments contrast sharply with the remark

made by the editor less than a month later in connection with the
Ludlow referendum proposal:

"America can be friendly and peaceful

with the world without shackling its hands against quick action in
emergencies ."88

The editor’s change in sentiment can be explained

only by the effect that the bombing of the Panay had on him.

His

immediate reaction to the incident was that "apologies cannot continue
indefinitely to be effective ."87

Shortly thereafter, the Daily Progress

supported "an enlarged naval program" as our best form of preparedness.
After all, "it stands to reason that the richest, most desirable and
coveted country in the world cannot afford to neglect its security,"

69

The sentiments of the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot concerning the
"Chinese tangle" first became clear in its comments on the Quarantine
Speech.

Recognizing: that the President’s "pointed" language might

encourage some collective action in which the United States would play
a role against Japan or Italy, the Norfolk paper believed that the
speech "serves a good and timely purpose for the President of the United

65Ibid.,
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States . . . to reach an arm across the oceans in support of the
nations that are seeking to hold in check the forces of war
Nevertheless, the Norfolk editor did reserve wholesale approval of
the Presidents implementing some of his vague pronouncements in any
manner he might see fit.

It should be noted that the Pilot interpreted

the Quarantine Speech as a definite departure from our neutrality
policy, a policy "inspired by a passionate national desire to avoid
embroilment in war under any pretext."

Since the Neutrality Act of

1937 represented "the last time the people spoke" through their Congress
on this country's foreign policy, the Norfolk editor made it clear that
"the President has no moral right to lead the nation into any material
commitments under [the Quarantine policy], without consulting Congress."
To leave no doubts about its position, however, the Pilot classified
itself "among the approvers [of] . . . the tenor and timeliness of
the Presidents Chicago speech. "7^
A few weeks later on the eve of the breakup of the Brussels
Conference, the Norfolk editor expressed his concern that "the Presidents
Chicago speech with its remarks about 'concerted' action to 'quarantine'
the treaty-breaking contagion, gave a misleading aspect of potency to
the Nine-Power Treaty conference which it helped to bring into being."
The Pilot's concern was due to the fact that "by the time the American
delegation set sail for Brussels, the idea of concerted quarantine had
been reduced to the idea of a 'negotiated' settlement of the particular
Far East treaty-breaking that the conference was to consider."

^ N o r f o l k Viagmian-Pilot, Oct. 6, 1937, p. 6.
71Ibid., Oct. 8, 1937, p. 6.
72Ibid., Nov. 14, 1937, p. 6.
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Later

65

the Pilot made what appeared to be a rather frustrating attempt to
discover something worthwhile in the Brussels Conference.

The best

the editor could do was to assert that "it serves the cause of realistic
diplomacy to find out from experience that a particular instrument of
intervention [the Nine-Power Treaty] is not suited to [the] cause in hand
. .. . . That much-— little as it is— is gain."

73

"It should be viewed calmly" was the first response of the
I

Norfolk paper to the bombing of the Panay.

After all,

11

whenever

foreigners are caught in the zones of war, . . . i t is almost impossible
to expect that they will escape all its consequences . . . [even] if
the combatants are honestly trying to avoid endangering them."

74

Although

a few days later the Pilot described the settlement of the Panay incident
"as welcome a Christmas present as the nation has received," it stressed
that the incident "has hardened America's attitude to Japan's machinations
in China, . .
gram,. . .

. has injected new life

and has

into

this country's armament

pro

left the peace-at~any-price structure definitely

weaker."7”* It was during the midst of the Panay controversy that the
Pilot asserted that the proposed Ludlow amendment would "in effect hand
cuff the nation."

Moreover, in the words of the editor, "it is not easy

to name a major American war in the past with reference to which the

73 Ibid.,
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people and the Congress differed.".

More than three months before the bombing of the Panay, the
editor of the Richmond Times Dispatch expressed his initial views on
the China Incident in an editorial-titled "Let's Pull Out of Asia!"
In one long but prophetic sentence the editor declared, "With the
Sino-Japanese conflict spreading rapidly, the Times Dispatch favors
the evacuation by the United States Government of any Americans now in
China who wish to leave, but as soon as those who are willing to go can
be gotten out of the danger zone, we see no reason why American war
ships and marines should continue to patrol an area so dangerous that
a single high-explosive shell might strike at any moment and sink one
of our ships . . . Total American investments in China amount to only
about $ 100 ,000 ,00 0 ," and they simply were not worth the risk of a
major war.

The Dispatch concluded that "the sooner this country pulls

out of the Far East, and lets it stew in its own juice, the better."

77

The editor reiterated these same sentiments three different times
during the next few days.

78

It was with complete justification, therefore, that the Dispatch
editor could write in December that "the blowing up of the United
States gunboat Panay, with numerous casualties, is just what we said
was going to happen, if this country persisted in keeping fighting
ships in the Far Eastern danger zone."

After remarking that "the

admirals are exerting too much influence over this Administration,"
the Richmond paper once again asserted that "there is no excuse for

76 Ibid., Dec. 16, 1937, p. 6 .

77Richmond Times Dispatch, Aug. 26, 1937, p. 10.
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keeping American warships in the Far Eastern danger zone."

79

While

most of the Virginia editors appeared to support demands on Japan for
guarantees against further "unlawful molestation" of Americans and
American interests in the Far East, the Dispatch just five days after
the attack on the Panay warned:

"we certainly do not want a war, and

one of the best ways to start one might be for us to continue to insist
on terms which the Japanese are unwilling to grant."

80

Also unlike many of the other state newspapers, the Dispatch
displayed no sympathy for the increasing sentiment in the United
States in late 1937 for an accelerated armament program and for an
economic boycott against Japan.

Specifically in regard to reports

from Washington concerning naval expansion, the Richmond paper con
tended with some suspicion that "unless this country is planning
aggressive policies which may draw us into a naval war with Japan
off the Asiatic coast, it is difficult to see any justification for
adding 10 or 15 cruisers to the fleet, over and above the ships already planned."

81

The Dispatch opposed an American boycott of Japanese

goods for two reasons.

First, the editor was doubtful that it would

diminish Japanese aggression in China.

Second, "the boycott inevitably

tends to create a belligerent state of mind."

82

Consistent with these

sentiments was the Dispatch Ts statement that the proposed Ludlow amendment "deserves serious consideration, instead of supercilious hoots."

79 Ibid., Dec. 14, 1937, p. 12.
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In an earlier reference to a similar resolution introduced in the
Senate, the Richmond paper, after recalling that "the World War is
the historic example of how the desire of the people for peace can
be overriden," stated that "the beauty of the [Senator Rober M.] LaFollette
amendment is that it gives the people of the United States the right to
say when they desire to become citizens of a Fascist state— or its
near equivalent— in order to fight a war abroad allegedly for the pro-

i
84
tec.tion of the democratic principle,"

Hence, from the time of its

first reaction to the China Incident through the settlement of the
Panay incident, the Dispatch maintained a stance directed towards
American non—involvement in the Far East.
Two other matters related directly to the undeclared
Sino-Japanese War— the Quarantine Speech and the Brussels Conference—
were given rather limited coverage by the Richmond paper.

The

Dispatch interpreted the Quarantine Speech as marking "an end to
splendid isolation," but the questions the speech left unanswered
made it impossible for the editor to speculate how it would change
what he referred to as our status of "interested bystander."

85

Al

though the Dispatch had "always been dubious concerning the probable
efficacy" of the neutrality legislation, the prospect that the
President's Chicago speech might reverse a policy supported by the
people disturbed the editor.

This disturbance was reflected in the

concern expressed that "the President not only fails to invoke the
neutrality act [against China and Japan despite their war not being

84Ibid., Nov. 19, 1937, p. 14.
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declared], but actually starts off in various respects directly
opposite to that chartered by Congress this very year."

The President's

"erratic conduct" in both domestic affairs (the Court packing scheme)
and foreign affairs "would seem to be endangering not only to his own
leadership but the influence of the United States as a world power . . ."

86

The Dispatch's concern about American prestige in the world was
intensified even more by what it termed the "pusillanimous" conduct of
the United States and the other fourteen powers represented at the
Brussels Conference.

As far as the United States was concerned, the

Richmond editor considered the "farcical international performance"
at Brussels to be unnecessary from the beginning.

Why?

In responding,

the Dispatch held true

to its overall coverage of the Far Eastern

situation:

Roosevelt and Congress have so many other problems

"President

on their hands at the moment that they can't afford a digression into
international affairs until national affairs are given the requisite
attention.

It is entirely possible that they would not want to exert

pressure on Japan, even if other problems closer home were not clamoring
for solution, and perhaps they ought

To summarize the

not to take such a risk."

87

sentiments of the nine editors in 1937 by

classifying each paper as either strictly isolationist or internationalist
is impossible.

Only two papers, the Fredericksburg Free Lance Star and

the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, fall neatly into either category.

86 Ibid., Oct. 15, 1937, p. 14.
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Fredericksburg paper, in its consistent opposition to United States
involvement in the Far East, its criticism of the Quarantine Speech,
and its calm acceptance of the bombing of the Panay, can be classified
as an isolationist paper.

The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, on the other

hand, can be labeled an internationalist paper considering its approval
of the "tenor" of the Quarantine Speech, its recognition that the
"peace-at-any-price structure" was weakened by the Panay. incident, and
its disapproval of the proposed Ludlow Amendment.

The other seven

papers are more difficult to classify although the Alexandria and
Charlottesville papers were consistently isolationist except for
brief "hawkish" flurries following the Panay bombing as was the Rich
mond paper aside from an initial favorable reaction to the Quarantine
Speech.
The only significant pattern that more than half of the nine news
papers falls into has to do with the relation between their reactions
to the Panay incident and the proposed Ludlow Amendment.

That the

critical reactions to the first influenced the negative attitudes toward
the second appears to be the ease with the Williamsburg, Roanoke,
Danville, and Norfolk papers.

That such was definitely the case with

the Charlottesville paper is demonstrated by the fact that the Daily
Progress supported a Senate proposal similar to the Ludlow one until
after the Panay sinking when it reacted critically to a war referendum.
In short, these five newspapers did not want the Congress to be
restricted by a Ludlow amendment in the event that something more serious
than the Panay crisis should break out in the future.

Although two

noted historians probably went a bit too far in asserting that the Panay

71

crisis "brought the United States to the verge of war,"

88 that

incident was serious enough to make papers previously strongly
isolationist, such as the Charlottesville paper, to break away brief
ly from their normal stance.

5
One scholar, however, is definitely amiss when he states in
reference to Roosevelt's Chicago speech that "the South, the most
international area in outlook, gave solid endorsement" to the
.
8
9
Quarantine Speech.

In an attempt to demonstrate that the American

press on the whole reacted favorably to Roosevelt's remarks of
October 5, Travis Beal Jacobs on the basis of four Southern news
papers located in Dallas, New Orleans, Miami, and Raleigh contends
that the South "gave solid endorsement."

The reactions of several

Virginia editors alone refute his thesis.

The Fredericksburg and

Charlottesville editors were particularly vocal in their opposition
to the speech, the latter fearing that Roosevelt's reference to a
"concerted effort" meant that a military alliance was being contemplated.
Even Jacobs's assertion that the South was "the most inter
national area" in 1937 is at odds with some impressive Gallup poll
results.

Americans were asked in June 1937:

"If other nations

should agree to reduce their spending for armaments, should America
agree to reduce its expenditures to the same extent?"

Only the West

Central states, by two percentage points, ranked ahead of the Southern
states in affirmative responses.
in the South replied "yes."
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Eighty-two per cent of those polled

Just five days after the Quarantine
r'

Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolationism, p. 24.
Jacobs, "Roosevelt's 'Quarantine* Speech," p. 492.
Cantril and Strunk, e d s ., Public Opinion, p. 17.

Speech but two months before.the Panay incident, the Gallup pollsters
asked:

"In order to declare war, should Congress be required to obtain

the approval of the people, by means of a national vote?"

The percent

age of Southerners replying positively was equal to that of Americans
polled in the West Central states— seventy-five per cent in each section,
a higher percentage than in any other section, believed the people should
approve war declarations.
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One area in which Southerners did seem

more "internationalist" was in regard to joining the League of Nations.
But even in this area, only forty-four per cent of the Southerners
polled in October 1937 felt that the United States should join the League.
Yet this figure was eleven per cent above the national average.

92

On

December 28, 1937, shortly after the sinking of the Panay, the Gallup
pollsters asked: "What policy should the government follow with regard
to American citizens in China— warn them to leave, and withdraw our
soldiers and naval forces, or continue to maintain the present armed
forces in China for their protection?"

Seventy-four per cent of the

Southerners polled stated that the United States should withdraw.

Only

in the West Central states did a higher percentage— seventy-seven per
cent— respond that this country should withdraw.
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To conclude, the

Gallup polls and the views of the Virginia editors in 1937 indicate that,
as in 1935, there are legitimate grounds for questioning the assertion
by some that the South was "the most international area in outlook."

91 Ibid., p. 1026.
92 Ibid., p. 403.
93 Ibid., p. 1074.

CHAPTER 3:

"PEACE IN OUR TIME"

Although Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of the Weimar Republic
of Germany in January 1933, several years passed before it dawned on
the world just what "Hitlerism" really meant.

As late as August 1935,

Winston Churchill wrote an article titled "Hitler— Monster or Hero?" in
which he concluded, "Both possibilities are open at the present moment. . .'
. . We must never forget nor cease to hope for the bright alternative."”
■'j

Churchill’s tone, however, changed dramatically during the next few
years.

Upon hearing Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s announce-

ment in 1938 that he was going to confer with Hitler at Munich,

2

Churchill reportedly hurried out of the Chamber of the House of Commons
and declared, "the government had to choose between shame and war.

Quoted by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Review of Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Edgar B. Nixon, ed., in The New
York Times Book Review, July 6 , 1969, p. 2.
2

For details of the Munich Conference, see Bailey, A Diplomatic
History, pp. 707-708; B u m s , Roosevelt, pp. 384 ff.; DeConde, American
Foreign Policy, pp. 572-573; Divine, Reluctant Belligerent, pp. 51-56;
Drummond, Passing of Neutrality, pp. 77-78; Langer and Gleason, Challenge
to Isolationism, pp. 32-39; Leonard Mosley, On. Borrowed Time, How World
War II Began (New York, 1969), pp. 61-91, passim; William L. Shirer, The
Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York, I960), pp. 409 ff.
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They chose shame and they will get war."

3

The increasing ferocity of

the anti-Jewish persecutions, the Nazi occupation of the Rhineland in
early 1936, the take-over of Austria two years later, then the
Czechoslovakian crisis— such a record as this explains Churchill's
outburst at Chamberlain's announcement.
When Hitler first announced his decision to add to his domain
the Sudetenland— the western, region of Czechoslovakia containing over
three million Germans— the Czechs and the French, with whom the Czechs
had signed a defensive alliance, began to mobilize.
imminent.

4

War appeared

The tenseness that gripped the world during the weeks imme

diately preceding the Munich Conference was aptly described by Ellen Glasgow
when she wrote that the universe seemed like a "vast lunatic asylum."'*
In the end, however, the premise on which the Fuehrer operated—
that "there is no solidarity in Europe," as he put it— held true and
war was averted.**

Before France would aid Czechoslovakia, it insisted

on British cooperation.

Russia, which also had an alliance with

Czechoslovakia, was not committed to act until after the French had done
r

so.

-

The fate of Czechoslovakia, therefore, lay with Great Britain.^
Chamberlain's well-known role in the crisis needs little explanation.

3
Quoted by Mosley,"On Borrowed Time, p. 63.
4
DeConde, American Foreign Policy, pp. 572-573.
^Quoted by Leuchtenburg, Roosevelt and the New Deal, p. 285.
^Quoted by Burns, Roosevelt, pp. 384-385.
^Divine, Reluctant Belligerent, p. 53.
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Although his first two meetings with Hitler at Berchtesgaden and
Godesberg resulted in an agreement on the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia,
it was the conference held at Munich on September 29 and 30 that has
gone down in the history books as the "climax of appeasement."

8

With

his furled black umbrella in one hand and a piece of paper signed by
Hitler and himself in the other, Chamberlain returned from Munich to
10 Downing Street assuring his people that "it is peace in our time."
For the most part, the United States, though greatly concerned,
remained quietly in the background as the leaders of Britain, France,
Italy, and Germany met at Munich to make the Czechs "the sacrificial
victims of the world-wide demand for peace at any price."

9

During the

days before Munich, Secretary of State Hull voiced some moral protest
ations and reminded the European dictators of the Kellogg Peace Pact,
but sneers proved to be the only r e s p o n s e s . B e f o r e a temporary
peace was assured, President Roosevelt sent a message to Hitler suggesting
that a meeting be held in a neutral European city in order that an
"unnecessary" and "unjustifiable" war might be avoided.

But Roosevelt

hastened to add that "the Government of the United; States has no political
involvements in Europe, and will assume no obligations in the conduct
of the present negotiations,."^

There is little reason to believe that

8

Ibid., p. 54. The final terms of the surrender are outlined by
Shirer, The Third Reich, pp. 421-422.
9
Divine, Reluctant Belligerent, p. 54.
■^Burns, Roosevelt, p. 385.
^Quoted by Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolationism, pp. 33-34.
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the President had any impact on Hitler's calling the Munich Conference.

12

Following the settlement, the worried Administration breathed a
sigh of relief.

Roosevelt confided to his ambassador in Rome, William

Phillips, that he was "not a bit upset over the final result."

13

To

the British Prime Minister he sent a telegram declaring that "I fully
share your hope and belief that there exists today the greatest opportunity
in years for the establishment of a new order based on Justice and on law.
Now that you have established personal contact with Chancellor Hitler,
I know that you will be taking up with him from time to time many of
the problems which must be resolved in order to bring about that hew
and better order.

The relief expressed as a result of Hitler's statement that the
Sudetenland "is the last territorial claim which I have to make in
Europe" proved, of course, to be momentary.^

Just how critical the

Czechoslovakian crisis was is reflected to some extent by the greater
coverage given to the international scene by the Virginia weeklies
during the fall of 1938.

The three conferences between Hitler and

Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich provided an
abundance of material for the Virginia editors to digest and analyze.
Their reactions to the abandonment of Czechoslovakia by Great Britain
and France were mixed and often confused.

Most of them, however,

allowed their distrust of England and France to reach a climax and
urged their own country to increase its armament program.
12

Most historians, such as Bailey and Burns, give Mussolini the
credit for influencing Hitler's decision to call a conference.
Shirer,
however, argues that Chamberlain was most influential.
13
14
15

Quoted by Leuchtenburg, Roosevelt and the New Deal, p. 285.
Quoted by Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolationism, p. 35.
Quoted by Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 708.

The Bedford Democrat Vs skepticism about Munich was apparent in
its observation that "it is probably too much to expect that the agreement . . . will be followed by an easing of the tension in Europe."

16

Looking inward, the Bedford editor stated in late 1938 that "by
constructing and maintaining a navy equal to that of any other power, . .
the land of the United States will be safe from invasion and the people
of the United States will give up no part of their liberties."

In short,

"we must pay for our isolation by being strong enough to take care of
ourselves without assistance,
On the eve of the Munich Conference, the Front Royal Warren
Sentinel agreed "with the Richmond Times Dispatch when it says Germany
must be reckoned with either now or five or ten years hence, when she
will be a much more formidable foe."

The Sentinel believed that "Hitler

is all bluff— but monstrously shrewd at his bluffing— and that either
England or Russia, or perhaps France alone, could stand him down with
out actual armed conflict, simply by making a demand and backing it up
with arms."

18

A few weeks after the "supine statesmanship of England

and France" at Munich had passed, the Front Royal editor still maintained
"That we will have war in a relatively short time . . . seems almost a
certainty. *.19
^

^

Among the weeklies the strongest words of praise for the Munich
Conference came from the Louisa Central Virginian.

In the words of

the editor, "the solution arrived at by the four great leaders,

16

Bedford Democrat, Oct. 6 , 1938, p. 2.

17 Ibid., Dec. 15, 1938, p. 2.

18

Front Royal Warren Sentinel, Sept. 29, 1938, p. 2.

19Ibid., Nov. 17, 1938, p. 2.
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Chamberlain of England, Daladier of France, Mussolini of Italy, and
Hitler of Germany, assures the continent of peace.

. . . our pen

gives praise to the four men for the sane and humane solution of a very
difficult problem."
of all the people."

20
21

The settlement was indeed "for the best interest
And six months after the

Munich Conference, the

Central Virginian still contended that "Mr. Chamberlain knew what he
was doing when he undertook and succeeded in giving the foreign countries
a plan, whereby peace is assured."

22

In a critical review of Britain1s role in world affairs during
the 1930*s, the South Boston Halifax Gazette asserted a week before
the Munich Conference:
slide in 1938.

"the British Empire will not have begun its

It began when its influence was not felt in checking the

rape of Manchuolcuo and the blotting out of [the] existence of Ethiopia,
its constant compromising attitude in respect to the functions of the
League of Nations and its surrender of credits in America.
been weak, vascillating

and an uncertainworldpower

However, should England

and France finallystand

Britain has

for twentyyears."

up toHitler

break out as a result, the Gazette warned its readers:

and

a war

"Don’t listen

to a lot of war propaganda . . . The United States must keep out of
this mess . . .

It is best not to fight if it can be avoided honorably.
24
The winner is usually also a loser."
In his initial reaction to the Munich Conference, the South

20

Louisa Central Virginian, Oct. 6 , 1938, p. 2.

21 Ibid., Oct. 13,

1938, p. 2.

22 Ibid., Mar. 16,

1938, p. 2.

23
'24

South Boston Halifax Gazette, Sept. 22, 1938, p. 4.
Ibid., Sept. 29, 1938, p. 4.

23

Boston editor asserted that "Czechoslovakians will be a happier people
after they have acclimated themselves to their cessation of Sudetenland
to the German government.

. . . The arrangement is much better than a

general war, as can be attested by a visit to some of the veteransT
hospitals in the United States, where one can see many ill and maimed
veterans, the result of the World War."

25

Yet the Gazette confessed

that while "war has been averted for the present . . ., there is no
assurance of lasting peace."

26

Furthermore, despite early praise for

the Munich agreement, less than a month after the Conference, the
South Boston paper warned that "the world may as well . . . b e prepared
to meet [Hitler's] aggression with the only argument he understands—
military force."

27

But it was not until early the next year that the

Gazette admitted fully that "the Peace of Munich . . . took away from
Czechoslovakia . . . its freedom and forever turned it over to the
mercy of Hitler who is now using it as a buffer state and trying to
pry into the Ukraine, a further step to his march toward the East."

As

for the United States, the Gazette appeared to favor an adequate prepared
ness program although it sympathized with those Americans who "do not
want an ill-advised orgy o f .extravagance and waste, even under the
guise of national defense."

28

Shortly after the Chamberlain-Hitler Conference at Berchtesgaden,
the British and French governments agreed to recommend to Czechoslovakia
that she accept HitlerTs demands for annexation of the German areas of

2~^Ibid., Oct. 6 , 1938, p. 1.
26 Ibid. , Oct. 20, 1938, p. 4.
27 Ibid., Oct. 27, 1938, p. 4.
oo

Ibid., Jan. 12, 1939, pp. 4, 8.
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Czechoslovakia.

Thus it was that the Williamsburg Virginia Gazette

condemned Britain a week before the meeting at Munich for her willing
ness "to sell Czechoslovakia down the river . . . "

Largely because of

this appeasement, "England . . . will now see her star of Empire slowly
setting. . . . A s far as this country is concerned we do not want to
have any part in the mixup, but stand ready at any time to defend our
shores."

29

Yet the same editor a week later asserted that "if we must

fight for liberty, better do it now and get it over with."

30

The Gazette described the Munich Conference as simply a "poisonous
mixture for democracy."

31

A few weeks later the Williamsburg paper

declared that as a result of the abandonment of Czechoslovakia, "war
was averted, but only for a season, during which time both England and
France have lost face and become third rate powers, a mighty come-down
for the haughty British."

32

Indeed "Premier Chamberlain of England

has been accused of being pro-Fascist, and from his actions it can very
well be believed.

It has been stated that he planned the present state

of affairs some time ago."

33

Hopefully, however, "the fate of Hitler"

will be sealed "sooner or later," for Fascism "will cause a surge of
restlessness to break out [in Germany] and with the first signs of
3 4

depression and its companions of want and misery, trouble will begin."

29

Williamsburg Virginia Gazette, Sept. 23, 1938, p. 2.

3QIbid., Sept. 30, 1938, p. 2.
31 Ibid.,

Oct.7, 1938, p. 2.

32 Ibid. ,

Nov. 25, 1938, p.

2. ^

33 Ibid.,

Nov. 18, 1938, p.

2.

3^Ibid..,

Oct. 21, 1938, p.

2.
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The Alexandria Gazette described Chamberlain’s second trip to
confer personally with Hitler at Godesberg as a "gravely gallant second
journey" that would make it clear to the world "that so long as Britain
shall endure it may take a great, a humble, a justified pride in the
knowledge that everything it could do to avert catastrophe was done."

35

But after Britain and France had agreed on September 18 to try to
persuade Czechoslovakia to accept Hitler’s terms, the Alexandria paper’s
tone changed somewhat:

"Britain is so slow and so reasonable!

wants to fight. . . . Britain doesn't care much about face.

It never

. . . Trying

to reason with Hitler about the peace of the world is-— Well, it just
doesn’t seem reasonable.”3^
The feelings of most of the editors about the Munich Conference’s
offer of "a moment’s peace" were reflected in the words of the Gazette:
"It seems too much to hope that . . .

the nations of the world will

discard forever the old method of settling disputes by force of arms. . .
We are wondering if and when and what he [Hitler] will demand next time
and what and how the nations of the world will answer then."

37

After

an examination of past pledges that Hitler had broken, the Alexandria
editor concluded that "the statesmen who made this peace at the muzzle
of a gun may be justified, but they cannot stop there.
not disarm.

There may be a bolder Hitler and a stronger Germany to stop

next year or the year after.

35

Civilization dare

„38

Alexandria Gazette, Sept. 17, 1938, p. 4.

38 Ibld. , Sept. 23, 1938, p. 4.
3 7Ibld., Sept. 30, 1938, p . ^4.
38Ibid., Oct. 5, 1938, p. 4.
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As reports mounted that "that bogus framework [the Munich peace]
39

was already cracking,"

reports based on the numbers of Czechs in the

Sudetenland who were being mistreated, the Gazette asked, "If the German
government will not be fair to them, should not Britain and France, which
sacrificed them for their own purposes, help them?"4^

A final blast was

directed at Britain and France wdien the Alexandria paper discussed the
"arbitrary rule" of their leaders.

In a reference to Munich, the

/

Gazette noted that "we have seen recently how the prime ministers of

Great Britain and France, considered the two greatest democracies in
the world after our own, recently made an epochal treaty with the
German dictator without troubling to get the sanction of their parlia-

ments, until it was too late to change the terms."

41

In the fall of 1938 the Fredericksburg Free Lance Star continued
to insist that "by staying home and minding his own business, Uncle Sam
can provide at least one ray of hope for disinterested advocation of
world peace."

Even if war should break out in Europe, "there is at

least some chance that the lessons learned between 1914 and 1917 would
enable the American authorities to maintain the brand of neutrality so
widely supported in this country.

...

American efforts to provide

moral guidance have been futile ever since the Wilsonian excursion into
the visionary realm of honest international cooperation.

equally futile now . . ."

39

42

They would be

"It would be well to remember [that] the

Ibid., Oct. 14, 1938, p. 4.

40 Ibid,, Oct. 13, 1938, p. 4.
41Ibid., Oct. 31, 1938, p. 4.
42

Fredericksburg Free Lance S t a r , Sept. 12, 1938, p. 4.
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last war . . . cost us more than$41,00 0 ,000,000 to be the good brother
to democracy, and at present the very nations of Europe, who could not
find funds sufficient to pay off $13,000,000,000 in war debts, are
raising many times that sum to fight another war.

. . .

All of the red,

white and blue bunting in the world . . . cannot hope to compensate us
43
for even the death of one lowly private in the rear rank."
Moreover,
\
although "what may happen in Czechoslovakia may be of direct interest
to Great Britain, France and Russia, . . .

its connection with New World

democracy is so remote as to merit meager consideration on the part of
official Washington."

44

alert observor [sic]."

"This country should simply play the part of

45

In reference to British and French acceptance of the partition
of Czechoslovakia, the editor asked, "If peace is to rest on such a
negative foundation, will it not prove to be . . . no peace at a l l ? " ^
Despite the consequences to be suffered by Czechoslovakia, the Star
asserted that that tragedy was "enlightening" to this country in that
"We have learned through the puerility of Chamberlain and of Daladier . . .
that no dependence can be placed in the statesmen of Europe, that too
often they are intellectually dishonest, that their promises, their
agreements and their treaties are meaningless, frequently are tricksters
and frauds."

Quoting from George Washington's famous Farewell Address,

the Fredericksburg paper asked, "Why quit our own to stand upon foreign
ground?

Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe,

43 Ibid., Sept. 19, 1938, p. 4.

44

Ibid., Sept. 12, 1938, p. 4.

45Ibid., Sept. 16, 1938, p. 4.
46

Ibid., Sept. 21, 1938, p. 6.
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entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition,
rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?"

The Star expressed consider

able relief that "we have 3,000 miles of water on one side and even more
secure natural protection on the other, together with a Navy second in
strength only to Great Britain."

48

The nationalistic viewpoints just quoted make it difficult to
/

explain the sentiments of the Star on the eve of the Munich Conference.
In an editorial highly critical of the Neutrality Act of 1937, the Fredericks
burg paper insisted that that legislation "is too rigid and unworkable
and should be discarded at the first possible moment."

The editor's

reasoning was as follows:
In event of a European war the Neutrality Act . . .
might become highly embarrassing to America. . . ..Suppose
it came to a case in which the democratic powers are depend
ent on us to save them from extinction under the might of
Fascism.
America would find such a condition highly unpleasant
as well as uncomfortable when we contemplate that we would
be the last great democratic government in the path of Fascist
domination.
Apparently the editor, although inconsistent, was not so unreasoning
that he would isolate the United States completely from the w o r l d even from the debtor countries— should the need for American aid arise.
The number of editorials in September concerning the Czechoslovakian
situation probably explains the Fredericksburg editorfs failure to comment
extensively on the Munich Conference in October.

The lesson was clear:

"Throughout the amazing .career of Adolf Hitler each objective achieved
has served merely as the jumping-off place for a n o t h e r . " H e has the

4 7 Ibid.,

Sept. 24, 1938, p.

4.

48 Ibid.,

Sept. 23, 1938, p.

6.

4 9Ibid.,

Sept. 28, 1938, p.

6.

50Ibid., Oct. 4, 1938, p. 4-
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democracies of Europe helpless under his heel, psychologically beaten,
quivering and impotent with terror."^
The editor of the Roanoke Times spoke too soon when he wrote in

early September 1938 that "the democratic nations have learned by this
time that Hitler respects force and force alone."

52

Then on the eve

of Chamberlain's first visit to the Nazi dictator, the Times declared
that "if Hitler doubts that England means what she says, he need go

nd further back than 1914 to discover that Britain does not take her
commitments lightly or seek to get out of them when the die is cast. . . .
It is nowT evident to all Englishmen, including, no doubt, the Prime
Minister himself, that Mr. Chamberlain's policy of appeasement has
not succeeded."

53

A few days later the Roanoke editor's high hopes were dashed
when he found himself writing:
It is a peace-at-any-price doctrine which moves
Chamberlain and Daladier to agree to look the other way
while Germany annexes the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia.

. .

Shameful as war is, there are things more shameful than
war, and one of them is for a greatNation to go backsquare
ly on its plighted
word and repudiate asolemncovenant
enter
ed into in good faith.-*^
Yet the initial reaction of the Roanoke editor to the Munich
Conference, despite his recognition of the injustices, was that a
partitioned Czechoslovakia might be better off in the long run than
a war in which she and other powers would have to confront a well-prepared
Hitler.

Furthermore, the editor pointed out "the fact that there is un

deniable merit in Germany's claim to the Sudeten, a region inhabited

51 Ibid., Oct. 22, 1938, p. 4.

52

Roanoke Times, Sept. 3, 1938, p. 6 .

53 Ibld., Sept. 14,

1938, p. 6 .

~^ I b i d . , Sept. 20,

1938, p. 6.
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principally by Germans who were deprived of their rightful nationality
by the treaty which ended the World W a r .11 . . . [Moreover] the preserva
tion of peace . . . will he hailed with great relief by the people of
Europe.

But for Mr. Chamberlain's patient, persistent and untiring

efforts to find a peaceable solution of the problem, this happy outcome
would not have been possible."'*"’

Two weeks after Munich, the Times

was still sympathetic towards Britain and France:

"Americans who are

prone to be harshly critical of Chamberlain and Daladier for yielding
toHitler's demands

. .. fail to givesufficientconsideration

fact . . . that Germany was ready forwar; England and

to the

Francewere

not

p r e p a r e d . B u t within a month after the German annexation of the
Sudetenland, the Roanoke editor concluded that "Adolf Hitler undoubted
ly scored the greatest triumph of his amazing career at Munich ."'*7
The Roanoke paper's position on the role that the United States
should play in world affairs in 1938 cari be classified as neither
isolationist nor interventionist— the Times had reservations about both
positions.

On the one hand, the editor asserted that President Roosevelt

"must know that intervention in Europe's controversies is the last thing
the people of the United States desire and in the formulation of American
foreign policy, . . .

he will be guided accordingly."

58

On the other

hand, the Times just one day later pointed out that "it would be well

~^ I b i d ., Oct. 1, 1938, p. 6 .
^^Ibid., Oct.

16, 1938, p. 6 .

5 7Ibid., Oct.

29, 1938, p. 6.

5ft

Ibid., Sept. 21, 1938, p. 6.
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for all of us to recall the solemn warning of Cordell Hull . . . on
March 17 last:

'isolation is not a means to security, but a fruitful

source of insecurity.

Unless there is concerted effort, there is

small hope of preventing the enthronement of the doctrine of force, and,
in its wake, inexorably, a relapse into barbarim.'"

59

In an attempt to predict what England would do in the event of
a Nazi takeover of Czechoslovakia, the Danville Register, like the
Roanoke Times, drew from past history when it recalled that German
leaders in 1914 "failed to comprehend that a solemn obligation was
more to England than the treaty that bound Germany to respect the
sovereignty of Belgium was to the war lords in B e r l i n , A l s o

like

the Times, the Register a few days later faced the grim task of
describing the signing by England and France of "the death warrant
of the Czechs."
the point:

The Danville editor's criticism of Britain was to

"Again has England bent her knee to Hitler, while a puzzled

world ponders . . . whether Britain is, in fact, as Hitler and Mussolini
have frequently proclaimed, a decadent nation, no longer able to enforce
her authority in world affairs."^

Continuing the next day, the editor

expressed his resentment of "Old World diplomacy" by thanking God that
"our country is so situated that it can afford to steer clear of entangle
ments that would enmesh it in the intricacies of the deceit and hypocrisy
that are the hallmarks of those who negotiate treaties for the nations
that lie beyond the seas."

59

62

Ibid., Sept. 22, 1938, p. 6 .

^Danville Register, Sept. 13, 1938, p. 4.
61Ibid., Sept. 20, 1938, p. 4.
62

Ibid., Sept. 21, 1938, p. 6.
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The Register condemned Britain and France for conceding at
the Munich Conference "all those things for which they made the world
believe they were prepared to fight."

63

England should know that

"a policy of ’stand and deliver’ will not forever best serve [her]
interests.

Prophetically the Danville editor asserted that "the

probability is that historians of another day, looking back on 1938,
will, when they review the circumstances under which Czechoslovakia
was placed upon the sacrificial altar, chronicle the Munich conferences
as the greatest diplomatic outrage, the most notorious sell-out recorded
in the annals of time."

63

As for the United States, the Register was

gratified to know that at least [our] government . . . has
not been lulled into a sense of security by what happened at
Munich, and that it will ask of the Congress that assembles
in January additional funds with which to strengthen our nation
al defenses. The United States must, whatever the cost, be pre
pared against the day when the war lords ofEurope and
of the
Far East feel they are sufficientlystrong to treat us as they
have England and France .66
The agreement by England and France to support the partition of
Czechoslovakia after Chamberlain’s first conference with Hitler sparked
the following self-righteous

remarks by the editor of the Charlottes

ville Daily Progress:

surprise was intensified many-fold by the

"This

inevitable conclusion that these one-time allies of the United States,
to whose rescue we hastened a scant quarter-century ago, had bowed spinelessly to the will of Hitler.

63 Ibid., Sept. 30, 1938, p. 4.

64

Ibid., Oct.

5, 1938, p. 4.

^ Ibid., Oct.

7, 1938, p. 6 .

^ I b i d . , Oct.

15, 1938, p. 4.

^Charlottesville Daily Progress, Sept. 21, 1938, p. 4.
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Chamberlain, in the words of the editor, was'thoroughly cowed and

brow-beaten."

68

A week later in its initial response to the Munich

Conference, the Daily Progress contended that the meeting "was no
victory for the forces of peace . . .
got what he demanded.
name of Peace."

69

...

The plain truth is that Hitler

A great crime has been committed in the

To the Charlottesville editor it appeared that

"pacts and promises no longer serve to allay our forebodings.

When

faith is gone there is little left of security. "7^
One of the most concise summaries of the precarious position
of England and France in the fall of 1938 came from the pen of the
editor of the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot on the very day that Hitler
and Chamberlain were to meet for the first time at Berchtesgaden.
Describing first the sentiments of most Americans, the editor wrote:
Separated by a wide ocean from Europe's turmoil, we
are under the temptation in the United States to over-simplify
the elements of the conflict— to think of it as a quarrel in
which everybody on one side is wrong and everybody on the other
side is right. . . . If our sympathies twenty-one years ago
were unmistakably with the Allies against the Central Powers,
they are today . . . even more definitely with France, Great
Britain and Czechoslovakia against Germany-— partly because
Czechoslovakia is a weak little democracy struggling to pre
serve its sovereignty against a voracious dictatorship . . . .
Fear of this new German imperialism and what it portends
for the safety of the British and French empires— this fear and
not an idealistic devotion to Czechoslovakia, its democracy or
its right to rule minorities that had rather be ruled by others,
determines the opposition of France and Great Britain.
. . . Czechoslovakia was only 50 per cent the result of
French-British carpentry directed to the construction of a
barrier against a revived German Push to the East. They cannot
now grant Hitler's demand for self-determination without opening
the door to the imperialism in behalf of which it is invoked.
That is the British and French dilemma.

^ I b i d . , Sept. 24, 1938, p. 4.
69Ibid., Oct. 1, 1938, p. 4.
7°Ibid., Oct. 13, 1938, p. 4.
^ N o r f o l k Virginian-Pilot, Sept. 15, 1938, p. 6.
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When Britain and France did open the door to "imperialism" by
agreeing to urge Czechoslovakia to accept partition, the Pilot made
the point that "today's world powers are just as contemptuous of
-

j

■

.

correct behavior as were the powers who dictated the peace treaties. . ."
The world powers were never more callous to this principle [of justice]
than they are today, never less burdened by moral scruples and— in
respect to certain human values universally respected before the World
War— never so barbaric."

72

England and France were even put into the

same category as Germany by the Norfolk editor:

"The doctrine that no

treaty can be allowed to thwart rational necessity, as that necessity
is defined by the treaty-violator once advanced by Germany alone has
now been embraced also by France and Great Britain."

73

The desertion

of Czechoslovakia will see no halt in the armaments race, contended
the Pilot, and "that will be its own eloquent commentary on the hollow
ness of the appeasement— its own realistic judgement that Czechoslovakia
j
has been deserted not to avert a decisive struggle but merely to postpone
it .-74
Once the cession— but not the means of cession--of the Sudeten
territory had been agreed upon, the Munich Conference was called in an
attempt to arrive at some peaceful solution.

The Norfolk editor

described vividly the viewpoint held by Czechoslovakia:

"There the

Munich conference can be regarded only as an emergency gathering of
friendly and hostile surgeons assembled to explore the possibility of
,
,.
. ,
.
.
..75
cutting up Czechoslovakia without cutting up the surgeons.

72 Ibid.,

Sept. 20, 1938, p. 6 .

73 Ibid.,

Sept. 21, 1938, p. 6 .

74 Ibid.,

Sept. 20, 1938, p. 6 .

75Ibid.,

Sept. 29, 1938, p. 6.

The next

day the Pilot summed up its feelings about the Munich agreement by
terming it "an ill-smelling peace."

76

An even more strongly worded

indictment against the "shot-gun solution at Munich" was the Pilot's
declaration that "the greatest armament race in peace-time history . . .
with all that it implies in cost and sacrifice and international rival
ry and International fear, [may be recorded] as another of the fruits
77
of ’peace in our time. 1,1
The Norfolk editor spoke for several of the other state editors
when he asserted, "Not much enthusiasm is to be expected in the United
States for a closer participation with a British nation methodically and
calculatingly embarked on the business of selling out the weaker nations
of Europe . .

As for America’s future policy, the Pilot endorsed a

continuation and enlargement of our armaments program in order that
we might be able "to protect our own economic and institutional safety. .
Making ourselves militarily powerful on a scale never before attempted
in times of peace . . . [is essential because] the Munich deal has pro
foundly altered the European picture and until we know more about the
collateral settlements that will flow from it, we shall on this side
beware of enlarging our foreign responsibilities."

78

The editor of the Richmond Times Dispatch recognized during the
midst of the Czechoslovakian crisis that he was living during "one of
the critical moments in history, one of those moments which may make
1938 as memorable in the long chronicle of the human race as 1914, 1815,

76Ibid., Sept. 30, 1938, p. 6.
77 Ibid., Oct. 17, 1938, p. 6 .

78

Ibid., Oct. 18, 1938, p. 6.

1789, or 1776."
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On the day that. Hitler first conferred with Chamberlain

Times Dispatch warned:

"Chamberlain may as well realize that he

cannot depend on any agreements Hitler may make."
Richmond paper continued its list of warnings:
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The next day, the

"If Britain and France

do not stop Hitler now, they will almost certainly never stop him .
Force is the only language Hitler understands.

...

No single concession

as to Czechoslovakia, however generous, will satisfy the insatiable Nazis.
On September 20 the Times Dispatch printed an editorial titled
"The Sell-Out to Hitler" which demonstrates clearly the influence that
one editor can have on another, particularly on one who writes for a
much smaller newspaper.

The Front Royal Warren Sentinel expressed its

agreement with the editorial on September 29, and a week earlier, on
September 22, the South Boston Halifax Gazette described the editorial
as "a masterpiece of an understanding mind, . . .
journalism."

a classic in modern

The editorial represented the Richmond paper’s reaction

to the initial agreement by Britain and France to accept the dismember
ment of Czechoslovakia.

The editor declared that "the year 1938 will

mark the beginning of the end of the British Empire, the decline of
France as a world power, and the rise of a German Empire far mightier
than that of Charlemagne."

As far as actual war goes, "the evil day

probably has merely been postponed."

In regard to United States reac

tion, the Times Dispatch believed that "one result of the sell-out
of Czechoslovakia to Hitler will be a great strengthening of isolationist
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Richmond Times Dispatch, Sept. 11, 1938, p. 2.

on

Ibid., Sept. 15, 1938, p. 8 .
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Ibid., Sept. 16, 1938, p. 12.
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sentiment in the United States.

Many Americans who might have been

inclined to come to the aid of Britain and France in a war with
Germany and Italy . . . will now feel that Britain and France are not

worth it."

As a consequence of Chamberlain and Daladier signing another

agreement "with the medieval fanatics" in Munich, "they need not count
on any help from this side of the water.
Mow let them lie in it."

They have made their bed.

82

Alone in the autumn of 1938 among the twelve newspapers examined
in this study, the Richmond Times Dispatch asserted

If the United States had joined the League . . . , the
world would be in a far less precarious state than it is today.

. .

No one who approves the course this country has pursued
since 1920, has a right to criticize those democracies for the
course they have just pursued.
The United States has followed policies in the past 18
years which have not only helped to make the rise of the
dictators inevitable, but which have made resistance by Britain
and France to the dictators much more difficult.83
Because it had supported the League of Nations and had sometimes
voiced opposition to America’s post-World War I foreign policy, the
Richmond paper felt justified in concluding a few days later that "the
Munich conference was a famous victory for the dictators."

84

The editor

wondered "whether Britain and France are not more greatly imperilled
today than they have been since the twentieth century dawned."
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These sentiments help explain the Richmond editor’s statement
that "time and again, during the recent European crisis, we kept
thinking how fortunate America is to be separated by 3,000 miles of
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Ibid., Sept. 20, 1938, p. 6 .
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Ibid., Sept. 26, 1938, p. 8 .
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Ibid., Sept. 30, 1938, p. 14.
Ibid., Oct. 2, 1938, p. 2.

water from Europe and 6,000 miles of the same commodity from Asia."
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The oceans and the fear of a "destructive economic boomerang" combined
to make the Times Dispatch leery of an inflated armament program:

"It

seems conceivable to us that the fear of external Fascism might offer
a grave threat to democracy in the United States, if it led us to join
the armament race.

An adequate Army and Navy we must have, but we

should remember that the best defense of our democracy will probably
begin, for some time to come, this side of the water’s edge of our
_
,,87
protective oceans.

The South Boston and Roanoke papers attempted editorially to
convince themselves that a partitioned Czechoslovakia might be better
in the long run.

Yet both.the editors had expressed their confidence

prior to the Munich Conference that Britain would not bow to Hitler’s
demands.

In their hopes for world peace, they were merely deceiving

themselves.

But they were not alone.

Many Americans apparently

harbored an uneasy optimism immediately following Munich.

In early

October 1938, a cross section of the American public was asked by
the Gallup pollsters:

"Do you believe that England and France did

the best thing in giving in to Germany instead of going to war?"
Approximately sixty per cent responded "yes."

Yet when they were

asked whether they thought the "settlement will result in peace for a
number of years or in a greater possibility of war," only forty per
cent believed that Munich would bring peace.

Furthermore, although

approximately sixty per cent approved the Munich settlement, only
twenty-three per cent of those polled considered Germany’s demands

86 Ibid., Oct. 14, 1938, p. 12.

87

Ibid., Oct. 18, 1938, p. 10.
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for the Sudetenland to be justifiable.

88

By November, however, as the

anti-Jewish persecutions were stepped up,, the Gallup polls revealed
that approximately ninety per cent of the American people feared that
Hitler was contemplating more seizures of European territory.

89

The gamut of editorial opinion in Virginia is represented by the
Louisa paper which termed the Munich agreement a "sane and humane
solution" and by the Norfolk paper which labeled it an "ill-smelling
peace."

Despite these extreme differences of opinion and despite the

confusion apparent in such papers as the South Boston Halifax Gazette
and the Roanoke Times, there were two responses to Munich that prevailed
among most of the papers.
peak.

First, the editors 1 Anglophobia reached a

Only the rural weekly in Louisa approved without reservation the

British actions.

Most of the other editors minced no words in letting

their readers know that they considered the British to be "barbaric,"
"spineless" "frauds" for taking part in such a "shameful" "sell out'."
To several, the British Empire appeared to be on the verge of collapse.
Frequently expressions of gratitude were voiced for the protective
oceans that separated this country from the Old World diplomats.

Related

to their denunciations of the British were the editors’ beliefs that the
Munich pact would only postpone war.

Again, only the Louisa editor for

any length of time and the South Boston and Roanoke editors for brief
periods expressed hopes of peace being preserved.
A second sentiment shared by six of the seven editors that
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Francis Sill Wickware, "What We Think about Foreign Affairs,"
Harper’s Magazine, LCXXIX (September 1939), 406.
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Divine„ Reluctant Belligerent, p. 55.

96

commented on it had to do with this country’s preparedness program.
Only the Richmond Times Dispatch, due to its fear of a "destructive
economic boomerang" and its faith in "our protective oceans," expressed
reservations about proposals to inflate America’s armament program.
Even the normally isolationist Alexandria Gazette asserted that
"civilization dare not disarm."

It should by no means be assumed,

however, that isolationism and preparedness were incompatible.

Although

"the anti-preparedness strain in isolationist thinking was [definitely]
on the wane" by 1938,

90

there was throughout the thirties what has been

called a "militarist trend" in isolationist thought.

91

The increasing

number of isolationists who supported military and naval appropriations
did so, as one should expect, because they believed that a strong
defense would act as a deterrent to any potential aggressor.

Never

was an offensive war a part of the isolationist "militaristic" thought.
Therefore, it would be unfair to conclude that the advocacy
of preparedness by the editors demonstrates a trend towards "internationalism."
Rather, Virginius Dabney, the editor of the Richmond Times Dispatch, has
written three decades after Munich some lines that seem to summarize-best
the sentiments shared by the majority of the Virginia editors:

"I was

extremely indignant over the sell-out of Czechoslovakia to Hitler, and
f
the tone of the editorials at that time was probably isolationist . . ...
.

Their purport . . . was that if Great Britain and France were going to
betray an ally in that manner, they could jolly well look out for themselves, since they didn’t deserve any help from us."
90
91
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Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, p. 247.

Jonas, Isolationism in America, p. 130.
Virginius Dabney to author, July 9, 1968.
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CHAPTER 4:

SEPTEMBER 1, 1939

Less than a year after Munich Neville Chamberlain informed the

House of Commons that Britain was going to war with Germany.

Two days

before, on September 1, 1939, the German invasion of Poland had begun,
and this time the British refused to appease Hitler."^ In his address
before the House of Commons, the Prime Minister declared:

"This is a

sad day for all of us, and to none is it sadder than to me.

Everything

that I have worked for, everything that I have believed in during my
public life, has crashed into ruins."

2

Actually Chamberlain's mental preparation for the autumn of
1939 had begun in the early spring of the same year when the Germans
went beyond the Sudetenland and extinguished the remainder of
Czechoslovakia.

Because of Hitler’s promises at Munich and because

the old excuse of racial affinity was not applicable, Chamberlain
asked publicly on March 17, 1939:
or is it the beginning of a new?

"Is this the end of an old adventure,
Is this the last attack upon a small

^For details on the days immediately preceding September 1, 1939
and on United States reaction to the outbreak of World War II, see Bailey,
A Diplomatic History, pp. 708-712; Burns, Roosevelt, pp. 394-400; DeConde,
American Foreign Policy, pp. 576-583; Divine, Reluctant Belligerent, pp.^
63-73; Drummond, Passing of Neutrality, pp. 83-111; Langer and Gleason,
Challenge to Isolationism, passim, esp. 201 ff.; Shirer, The Third Reich,
passim.■
'
'
.
2

Quoted by Shirer, The Third Reich, p. 619.
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state, or is it to be followed by others?

Is this, in fact, a step in

the direction of an attempt to dominate the world by force?"

A few days

later, in response to Hitler’s reopening a dispute with Poland over
Danzig and the Corridor, Chamberlain announced that England and France
would go to the aid of Poland should her independence be threatened.

3

This turning point in British and French diplomacy marked the end of
the era of appeasement.
When Germany signed a non-aggression pact with Russia on August
24, Hitler’s path to Poland was no longer obstructed by fears of
opposition from the east.

The democracies could only wait for the

expected move to be made by the totalitarian states.

As one American

diplomat noted, it was like "sitting in a house where someone is dying
upstairs.

There is relatively little to do and yet the suspense con

tinues unabated."^
time.

The suspense was relieved,

of course, in a we e k ’s

World War II had begun.
A few hours after Britain and France declared war on Germany,

Franklin Roosevelt declared in a fireside

chat that "this nation x^ill

remain a neutral nation, but I cannot ask that every American remain
neutral in thought as well.
of facts."

Even a neutral has a right to take account

But, the President concluded, "as long as it remains within

my power to prevent, there will be no blackout of peace in the United
S t a t e s . R o o s e v e l t wasted little time in letting it be known that he
considered the best means of keeping this country neutral was by revising

3
Quoted by Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolationism, pp. 69,
74-75.
”
4
Quoted by Leuchtenburg, Roosevelt and the New Deal, p. 293.
^Quoted by Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolationism, p. 204.

99

the 1937 Neutrality Act.
embargo repealed.

Most importantly, he wanted to see the arms

Earlier attempts to repeal the embargo were met

with strong isolationist opposition in Congress.

As Vice-President

John N. Garner told Roosevelt in July 1939, "Well, Captain, we may as
well face the facts.
is to it."
votes.

6

You haven’t got the votes, and that’s all there

With the outbreak of war, Roosevelt would soon get the

In November, Congress passed the Fourth Neutrality Act which

repealed the arms embargo but permitted the sale of munitions and other
goods to countries at war only on a cash and carry basis.
loans of ninety days were allowed to the belligerents.

Short-time

The old pro

vision forbidding American citizens to sail on belligerent ships was
retained and, as a new concession to the isolationists, American ships
were barred from sailing in combat zones specified by the President.^

The primary concerns of most of the Virginia editors during the
weeks immediately following the start of World War II were related:
the fate of the Allies and the role to be played by the United States.
By mid-September the editor of the Bedford Democrat was pondering what
part the United States might play in the war.

Although he recognized

"the fact that Britain and France are our first line of defense," he
did not believe that "the United States will get into any European
war unless and until it appears certain that Great Britain and France
will be defeated.

8

with Germany.”

This is not indicated in the struggle now going on
To help justify its position, the Democrat urged its

Quoted by DeConde, American Foreign Policy, p. 576.
^Congressional Record, 76 Cong., 2 sess., Oct. 27, 1939, pp. 1024-1027.
o

. Bedford Democrat, Sept. 14, 1939, p. 2.
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readers not to forget the World War and how "it sowed the seeds for_
the years of social discontent and depression that followed. . . .
[In addition] thousands of American lives and untold millions in
American wealth and resources were sacrificed.

Only history will

eventually reveal what good., if any, came from that war."

These

memories provided the background for the Democrat1s insistence that
"American neutrality is dependent upon America keeping its head."

The

Bedford paper even went so far as to assert that "American neutrality
is a practical as well as an idealistic necessity."

Its reasoning

was as follows:
If this nation goes to war, freedom and representative
government will automatically end, perhaps permanently. . . .
We will have one-man government in this country from the
instant war is declared, just as completely as Germany has
been subjected to the will of one man. Likewise, in view of
the present Federal debt, a war would mean ultimate financial
chaos— which alone is sufficient to destroy freedom.
The greatest service that this country can render the
world today is through maintenance of representative govern
ment, tolerance, and individual liberty within its own borders.
Only by doing that can the acts of peace be preserved and a
toe hold saved for the rebuilding of world civilization after
chaos has had its day abroad.9
Significantly, however, the editor still abided by a statement
he had written four months earlier in which he declared that the
neutrality laws should be amended primarily because the mandatory
embargo "inevitably works to the advantage of one contender or the
other.

The Democrat believed that in our remaining aloof, "re

tention or repeal of the embargo has nothing to do with the possibility
of this country getting involved in the war . . .

9Ibid., Sept. 28, 1939, p. 2.
10Ibid>, May 11, 1939, p. 2.
11Ibld., Oct. 5, 1939, p. 2.
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More than two months before the non-aggression pact was signed
between Hitler and Stalin, the Front Royal Warren Sentinel predicted
that "when war comes . . . , it will be a contest between so-called
Christian nations and pagan nations:
It will be a bloody day.

a contest between ideologies. . .

A war between Russia, Germany, and Italy

on one side, and the British Empire, America and France on the other.

. ."

12

Once the pact was drawn up between Germany and Russia, the Sentinel reiterated
its firm belief that "the ideologies of those two and the democratic ideologies must conflict on a battlefield."

13

Despite his earlier assertion that America would be found fighting
on the side of the democracies, the Front Royal editor declared after
the war actually broke out that "whether the United States enters the
war will depend upon the people.

...

If Russia enters into a military

alliance with Germany, it is likely that America will be drawn in.

But

now that the die is cast, Americans would be wise to sift the oceans of
propaganda and to pray that Tthis scourge of war may pass quickly from
us. 11,14

As for the merits or necessity of the war, the editor’s

simplistic feelings were quite evident when he contended that "there
is something absurd about staging a world war merely to change a government m

one country. •»15

The Sentinel minced no words in its opposition to those who in
sisted that this country could remain neutral even if the arms embargo

12

Front Royal Warren Sentinel, June 8 , 1939, p. 2.

13 Ibid., Aug. 24, 1939, p. 2.

14

Ibid., Sept. 7, 1939, p. 2.

15Ibid., Sept. 14, 1939, p. 2.
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were repealed.

Rather than pursue such a "spineless course,11 the Front

Royal paper strongly suggested that if America "believes that the Allies
are morally right; that a ■Red— Nazi victory is burdened with unknown
Incalculable menaces to hex future well-being;

. . . that her cream-puffish,

pseudo-neutrality will never delude the Germans into thinking that it is
a real neutrality;
neutrality.

. . . if she believes this, let her forget about

Let her keep tier men here but send munitions, and war

supplies of all-description [sic] to England and France forgetting the
cost in an effort to get tfais sorry war over as quickly as possible."
In short, the Sentinel concluded, "Americans should realize that a . . .
wishy-washy neutrality, neither safeguards us from war, nor aids those
whom we want to aid as much as it should."

16

The sentiments of the

Front Royal paper were expressed a bit more concisely three weeks
later when the editor stated, "The Sentinel believes that America can
fee safely neutral for the present.
and France must win.

But it also believes that England

As long as America is in the world and affected

fey other nations, neutrality is not a cure-all.
Dp until the last minute the Louisa Central Virginian predicted
that there would be no war.

With an abiding faith in the Munich agree

ments, the editor contended in the late spring of 1939 that "there
will be no war in Europe ia the very near future.

The credit is due

to Lord Chamberlain, who, like our great President Roosevelt, is
against war."

18

And just one day before Hitler's troops invaded Poland,

the Louisa editor remarked,, "we still contend that there will be no

16Ibid., Sept. 28, 1939, p. 2.
^ I b i d ., Oct. 19, 1939, p. 2.
18

Louisa Central Virginian, May 28, 1939, p. 2.
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war."

19

Finally, when the fact could not be denied, the Central Virginian

in an editorial titled "It Looks Like War" expressed the hope that "when
[Hitler] sees his tactics defeated . . ., he will commit suicide . . ."

20

In regard to this country, the Louisa paper declared, "America
will never enter any more foreign wars if our great President, who is
backed by 90 per cent of our people, ever has anything to do with it."
Europe’s quarrels are Europe’s business, and . . .
out of the mess."

22

21

we must keep our hands

In its unquestioning loyalty to Franklin Roosevelt,

t^ie Central Virginian endorsed the President’s recommendations for re
vision of the neutrality legislation:

"In his effort at keeping us

out of war, . . . w e feel quite sure that our President’s recommendation and his plea for neutrality will finally be adopted."

23

No doubts

were expressed by the Louisa editor that neutrality revision might
destroy neutrality.
Like the Central Virginian, the South Boston Halifax Gazette
also viewed the Russo-German non-aggression pact as setting the stage
for a clear cut battle with one side composed of the "common enemies
of Democracy:

. . . Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Communist Russia."

That such a situation was permitted to develop was attributed largely
by the Gazette to "the advice of the jelly fish Chamberlain."

19 Ibld., Aug. 31, 1939, p. 2.
20

21

Ibid., Sept. 7, 1939, p. 2.
Ibid., Sept. 28, 1939, p. 2.

^ I b i d ., Nov. 9, 1939, p. 2.
^ I b i d . , Oct. 5, 1939, p. 2.
24

South Boston Halifax Gazette, Aug. 24, 1939, p. 4.
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Earlier in an editorial titled "Let It Be Known that America Is
Committed to Defense of Democracy," the South Boston paper demonstrated
its hearty approval of any efforts this country might make in a future
war- towards helping the democratic countries.

In the words of the

editor, "This country has sensed the possibility of the breakdown of
European democracy, and in its breakdown she has envisioned the Atlantic
and the Pacific being closed against her.

It is no longer a fight of

European nations; it is a fight for the preservation of human liberty
on this earth.

America stands guardian of human rights."

25

The next

month the Halifax Gazette remarked, "It is an easy matter to talk of
peace, letting Europe alone and harking back to the Farewell of George
Washington . . . But for us to close our eyes to the issues involved is
to follow the fabled ostrich and bury our faces in the sand that we
may hide from our own calamity."

26

Six weeks before the outbreak of

World War II, the Gazette again asserted that "we believe that the
world, to be a safe place in which to live, must be an Anglo-Saxon
World [sic] and we further believe that the three democracies [England,
France and the United States] will eventually come through with flying

i
i.27
colors.
Yet the first reaction of the South Boston editor to the out
break of war was:

"It is sincerely to be hoped that we hear nothing

in this war about making the world safe for Democracy."

Even more

interesting were the editor’s following remarks:
While there is but little doubt that the sympathies
of the people of the United States lie absolutely with Poland

25Ibid.,

Mar. 16, 1939, p. 1.

26Ibi d .,

Apr. 27, 1939, p. 1.

27Ibid.,

July 20, 1939, p. 1.
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and her two Allies, there seems to be no reason for us to
be worried over who owns the Free City of Danzig. . . The
Free City of Danzig and the Polish Corridor are something
like four thousand miles away from the United States . ... .
the simple fact that Danzig has belonged to any of three
countries [Poland, Germany, and Russia] has heretofore
caused no uneasiness in America and we cannot see for the
life of us why it should n o w . 28
With his mind clearly on the First World War, the editor, who had
earlier endorsed Roosevelt’s call for neutrality revision,

29

warned

that"America today, to keep out of this conflict, must watch care
fully news from over the seas.
propaganda.

It will come to us tainted with

It is to the interest of some to have us enter the

30
war, it is of interest to a great many more for us to stay out of i t .11
The Williamsburg Virginia Gazette, a staunch supporter of the
House Un-American Activities Committee, expressed its feelings about
the opening blasts of World War II as follows.
We in America can be very thankful that we have even
an ocean between us and Europe and which for the present, '
will at least be a safeguard from without.
It is, however,
for us to watch with increasing care that all spies, alien
disturbers of our government, Communists and Fascists be
given short shrift.
In the next issue of the Gazette, the editor continued:

"what

this country needs to keep us in peace, is a drastic purge, of all those
who foster
War.

and preach theisms which hurled Europe into another World

. .. The evil forces in

our own country . . .

a halt will lead us into a war of our own."

if not brought to

32

As far as the war overseas was concerned, the Williamsburg

JO
Ibid., Sept. 7, 1939, p. 8 .
29 Ibid., Sept. 14, 1939, p. 1.
30 Ibid., Sept. 21, 1939, p. 1.

31

Williamsburg Virginia Gazette, Sept. 8 , 1939, p. 2.

^ Ibid., Sept. 15, 1939, p. 2. Editorials of Oct. 13, 1939 and
October 20, 1939 also expressed concern over conspiratorial forces at
work within this country.
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editor felt the United States should revise its neutrality legislation
by repealing the embargo and inviting "the English and French to buy all
the war material and food necessary to help them save . . ./democracy."

33

Repeal of the embargo, the editor insisted, "is the only safe, sane and
proper course to take. . . .We should do all that can be done, to make
[our] munitions accessible to the democracies of Europe, by telling
them to come and buy for cash, all we can supply and take them away
in their own ships and assume all the responsibility of doing s o . . .

.

If a war has to be fought, . . . we should be in the position of supplying
all munitions needed to hasten the war to an early end."
even with repeal of the embargo, the editormaintained
no unneutral act.

Most important,

that "This is

We . . . w i l l not assume any stand, other than to

sell and deliver on the terms as enacted by theNeutrality Act, as
changed..

. . [Frankly,] we want thebusiness .

. . We will not supply
34
any more man power, just the sinews of war that they can buy here."
The Alexandria Gazette noted a week after the war started that
this nation*s neutrality legislation, particularly the arms embargo,
hampered the "solid line of democracies" because it was "playing into
35

the hands of aggressor countries now well supplied with arms."

It

was the editorTs contention that "a vote to repeal the present [neutrality]
law is a vote . .. . to keep the country out of war."

36

The Gazette endorsed preparedness as a further safeguard for
keeping this country out of the war:

"we should put ourselves in

33 Ibid., Sept. 22, 1939, p. 2.
34 Ibid., Sept. 29* 1939,/p. 2.

35
Alexandria Gazette, Sept. 7, 1939, p. 4.
36Ibid., Oct. 9, 1939, p. 4.
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a strong position of self-defense and then sit tight, riding out the
war if possible without getting into it.

The practical import of this

military and naval expansion is that we are less likely to be drawn into
the war if we are strong than if we are weak, because aggressors respect
37

strength."

In looking to the future, bitter memories of the past

seemed to support the Gazette Ts hopes that the United States might
stay out of the second war.

In the words of the editor, "We hoped

for a better world last time, but we got little more than a continuation
of evil forces not yet exhausted.

Few of us now have the hardihood

to prophesy ."33
"Something is wrong with a world which permits such folly,"
declared the editor of the Fredericksburg Free Lance Star on the day
World War II broke out.

39

The editor expressed his hope that Congress

would pass "a strong neutrality law which would be fool-proof and serve
to discourage Europe from attempting to lure us into its endless and
cruel disputes."

40

More specifically, "our present neutrality law,

which has the effect of being un-neutral, should promptly be revised
so that our supplies and materials will be at the disposal of those
nations fighting to save the world from the extinction of free govern
ment."

The editor was "convinced that our immediate interests and our

future welfare and that of the world depends on the survival of England
and France.

[Therefore,] we must make our resources available to them

41
so that they can better defend themselves."

Despite our support for

37 Ibid., Sept. 12, 1939, p. 4.
io

Ibid., Sept. 23, 1939, p. 5.
39

Fredericksburg Free Lance Star, Sept. 1, 1939, p. 6 .

4 ^Ibid., Sept. 6 , 1939, p. 4.
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Ibid., Sept. 16, 1939, p. 4.
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the democracies, however, Americans must recognize that "several of
the European nations have put their fpublic relations* machinery to
high gear in a prospective attempt to influence American opinion.

The

American people will do well to be on the alert for any and all evidences
of prejudicial comment.

Propaganda played a big part between 1914 and

1917 when this country was trying to maintain a neutrality policy."

42

Two days after Hitler*s troops invaded Poland, the Roanoke Times
asserted that "for the moment America's course is clear.

It is to

stay out of Europe's quarrels and have no part in this suicidal struggle
which has been precipitated «. . . by one man's brutal lust for power . . .
It is not a question where our sympathies lie; it is a question of duty
to our own people and to civilization."
the next day:

43

The Roanoke editor continued

"America's sympathies clearly lie with the Allies . . .

That is not so much because Americans are pro-British or pro-French
or pro-Polish as because they are anti-Hitler.

. . . Whatever America

can do to further the cause of the Allies, short of actually going to
war, will be done in the months that lie ahead.

For America can conceive

of no greater catastrophe that could befall the world than for Hitler
to triumph in the war that he has caused, the war that nobody wanted
and that everybody, save Hitler, sought to prevent."

44

A few days

later the Times endorsed Roosevelt's call for repeal of the arms
embargo. 45

42
43
44

Ibid., Sept. 11, 19.39, p. 4.
Roanoke Times, Sept. 3, 1939, p. 6 .
Ibid., Sept. 4, 1939, p. 6 .

45Ibid., Sept. 12, 1939, p. 6.
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The past was definitely on the Roanoke editor’s mind when he
declared that America, if it is truly neutral, must permit Germany as
well as Great Britain to search our vessels for contraband.

Further

more, if the United States adopts a truly neutral attitude on this
matter, "it then follows that she has no quarrel for protest if German
submarines sink American vessels which fail to stop when ordered to do
so.

If an American ship is thus sunk, we may expect a widespread cry

of indignation all over the country.
for that possibility."

We should prepare ourselves now

46

The day after the German blitzkreig began in Poland, the editor
of the Danville Register noted that "just under twenty-one years ago
we celebrated with rejoicing the victorious close of the war that was
to end all wars.

. . . [Indeed] we may be grateful for the ocean that

separates us from Europe and its endless wars of clashing nationalities.
„47
•

•

•

Nevertheless, in a long editorial titled "Facing Some Facts,"
the Register stressed that the United States would join the Allies
militarily before it would watch them fall to Hitler.
declared:

The editor

"it may be that we shall see England and France with their

backs to the wall, fighting for the right to exist.

We . . . cannot

spare either of them. . . . We may view them both as defaulting debtors.
We have reason to regard them as ingrates, who soon forgot our help,
after we had made their victory possible in the last war.

But never

theless, we are bound to them by too many ties for it to be likely
that the American will stand idly by and see them destroyed, or even
reduced to the role of powers subservient to Adolf Hitler."

46Ibid. , Sept. 14, 1939, p. 6.
47
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The editor stressed that "no one has any wish for our country to pull
British chestnuts out of any fire, nor are we interested in preserving
intact the far-flung possessions that go under the noun of the British
Empire."

But, the editor continued, "this country has a great heritage

from England as well as from France in terms of law, government, and
ideas.

In conclusion, we cherish our democracy, but we have no wish

to see the time come when we would be its sole exponent in the world.
We want peace, but the time may come when our people may decide that
its cost is too high.
any price."

48

We have never been willing to purchase it at

Still, the Register remained a bit leery about possible

United States intervention.

For example, its reaction to "reports

that Adolf Hitler would welcome the mediation of President Roosevelt
in efforts to bring peace in Europe" was that "this country has had
one experience in an attempt to remake the map of Europe, and the re
sults are not such as to tempt us into another excursion into European
affairs.

The Treaty of Versailles was a product of Woodrow Wilson’s

idealism, amended and modified by the realism of the other members of
the Big Four . . . The result has been neither ideal nor realistic."

49

One factor that "might well serve to keep us out of war,"
declared the Register, would be an increase in the army.

Looking back,

"it is hardly probable that Germany would have given us the provocation
that she did in 1917 had stae realized that we could have given effective
aid to the Allies as soon as we did."^^

4 ^Ibid., Sept. 20, 1939, p. 4.
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Like most of the other papers,

Ill

however, the Register believed that a revised neutrality law designed
to help the Allies would be our best safeguard.

The editor endorsed a

cash and carry policy that would permit the Allies to purchase munitions
from the United States while simultaneously keeping this country’s ships
out of the war zones.

51

The hopes the editor had for neutrality revi

sion were realized, of course, in the Neutrality Act of 1939.
The Charlottesville Daily Progress advocated neutrality revision
a week before the invasion of Poland:

”It would seem sensible . . . .

to eliminate the automatic arms embargo clause, renew the ’cash and
r
carry’ provisions, keep American ships out of combat zones, sell
goods on our own shores and let the purchasers come here for them.

Even

that might not guarantee our neutrality but it would be better than the
52
present muddle.”

Continuing two weeks later, the editor declared,

"There is no doubt that such a modification in the [Neutrality] Act
would favor the nations we want to see win the war.
control the Atlantic.

Great Britain would

Our supplies would be of inestimable value to

the democracies and incidentally, to us."

53

Yet the Daily Progress

maintained that "there is no valid reason why the enactment of a ’cash
and carry’ system and our participation in the war should have any
connection.

,,54

In response to those who insisted that neutrality revision would
increase our chances of being dragged into another war, the Daily Progress
argued:

"That there will be strong pressure upon this country to side

^ I b i d ., Sept. 22, 1939, p. 4. Similar sentiments on neutrality
revision were also included in editorials of Oct. 4, 1939 and Oct. 24, 1939.
52

Charlottesville Daily Progress, Aug. 24, 1939, p. 4.

53 Ibid., Sept. 6 , 1939, p. 4.
54Ibid., Sept. 14, 1939, p. 4.

—;

with the Allies . . .

must be realized by all.

simply have to be resisted!

The pressures will

It hinges not upon repeal or retention of

the arms embargo but upon a resolute and unshakable will not to send
armies abroad."^

As the prospects of Congressional approval of neutral

ity revision became brighter, the Charlottesville editor again admitted
that "mechanical safeguards of peace are, of course, imperfect. . . .
But, in the light of present circumstances, the program about to be
enacted by Congress seems about the best neutrality insurance we can
take out."

56

The Daily Progress, however, was most frank about the

new neutrality law when it asserted:

"Considering the mercenary nature

of the diplomatic maneuvers that have guided world destiny in the past
few years especially, it seems quite beside the point to argue that
we have a ’moral

obligation 1 to be impartial as well as neutral.

If

we follow a course that reacts to our own advantage, as well as to the
advantage of our friends, we are following a general precedent ."~*7
One change that the editor insisted should not be incorporated
our neutrality revision was extension of credits to the Allies.
editor insisted:

in

The

"That is exactly the point at which we must stop.

We can stay out of war.

We must stay out!"

58

In the first weeks

following the German blitzkreig in Poland, the Daily Progress remained
adamant on the point that the United States must not be drawn into another
foreign war.

On September 21 the Charlottesville editor declared that:

55 Ibid., Oct. 3, 1939, p. 4.
56 Ibid., Oct. 28, 1939, p. 4.
57 Ibid. , Nov. 6 , 1939, p. 4.
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What is needed in this country today is a "national
psychology" irrevocably opposed to participation in the
European War. The formation of such a "psychology" depends
upon every one of us individuals. . . . Every time we pessim
istically repeat the expression, "Oh, we'll be drawn into this,"
we perform a disservice to our country.
The time has come for us to look at our problems in the
same way most European statesmen have looked at their problems
since this country began— cold-bloodedly. . . . As much as we
like to believe the contrary we are not prepared to fight a
combination of powers on European soil. . . . We detest
Hitlerism but it is not for the United States to stop it in
Europe.
L e t ’s forget our "frontier on the Rhine." Let's draw
that frontier up and down the eastern and western shores of
this Continent. We do not believe any power or combination of
powers will try to invade this Continent— certainly not for some
time. If they ever do let’s stay over here, meet them at the
shore, and be prepared to blast them back into the middle of the
Atlantic Ocean.^9
The next day, the Daily Progress repeated that "though no safeguards
are perfect, the best possible course seems to be to stay over here,
sell over here and be prepared to defend this Hemisphere . . . .

Our

• -i
.
.
_
.,60
single purpose must be to remain out of war.
In order to help justify his position, the Charlottesville editor
presented on September 26 some statistics on losses the United States
suffered during and as a result of World War I.

For example, he noted

that "the cost of the World War to the United States
the current World Almanac at $41,765,000,000."

is estimated in

The still lingering

depression led the editor to conclude that "the course of reason
dictates neutrality.

Continuing in October, the Daily Progress

declared, "we have nothing to gain from entering the war.

We got

nothing out of the World War but several billions of dollars in
promises which have remained promises.
never solve the problems of Europe.

59

Ibid.,

Sept. 21, 1939, p. 4.

6°Ibid.,

Sept. 22, 1939, p. 4.

61Ibid.,

Sept. 26, 1939, p. 4.

. . ... We have never and will

Perhaps we can solve our own.
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That should be our goal."

62

We must 'temember that it takes 10 times

as long to pay for a war as it does to fight it."

63

Finally, in an

editorial headed "No Repetition," the Charlottesville editor contended,
"Our cynicism developed after, not before, the World War and we entered
it on a highly idealistic plane; it is only in retrospect that our
idealism appears to have been preposterous.
to hold we were duped into it.
as well as a costly^experience.

Nor is it entirely accurate

All that aside, it should prove a valuable
It should keep us over here this time ."^4

Dominating the editorials of the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot during the
month of September were continuous calls for revision in our neutrality
legislation.

Contending that "what we must now do is to take every

reasonable precaution to avoid being sucked into the new carnage," the
Pilot advocated restoration of the cash and carry policy and "strengthening
[of] our army, navy and air corps without interruption ."^3

Furthermore,

"both categories, arms and munitions on the one hand and everything else
on the other hand, ought, in our opinion, to be on the same cash-andcarry basis."

66

Indeed, "short of that remedy there is no good likeli-

hood of our escaping the fury of the rising blockade."

67

As for repealing the arms embargo, the Pilot in an editorial
critical of Senator William Borah*s opposition to repeal, admitted

62 Ibid., Oct. 4, 1939, p. 4.
63 Ibid., Nov. 2, 1939, p. 4.
64 Ibid. , Nov. 15, 1939, p. 4.

^Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, Sept. 5, 1939, p. 6 .
66 Ibid., Sept. 7, 1939, p. 6 .
67Ibid., Sept. 15, 1939, p. 6.
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that “there is some danger that lifting the arms embargo might
give us such a vested interest in the war that we may end by active
participation in it.

But that danger, we think, is far less substantial

than the danger that we may be bludgeoned into war by belligerent acts
of violence against American ships and crews."

Confessing also that,

first “the desire to help the Franco-British bloc with the munitions
resources of the American market is an important factor in the amendatory
movement" and second that "the desire for war profits also has a part
in this movement" for repeal of the arms embargo, the Norfolk editor
nevertheless insisted that "neither of these considerations or both
shall be the controlling reason for amending the neutrality law— . . .
the controlling reason shall be diminution of the danger of our embroil
ment in the war."

In conclusion the Pilot declared that:

the Borah plan of excluding from American-flag ships
arms exports destined for the belligerents, but not the
hundreds of other necessities of war, is more dangerous than the
Roosevelt-Hull-Stimson policy of excluding from American ships
all exports to the belligerents whatever their nature, and of
allowing the belligerents to buy in this market anything they
want, provided they acquire title to it before it is loaded on
ship and provided they take it away in their own bottoms. That
policy will undoubtedly serve the powers whose navies control
the open seas, but it will also serve our own desire to avoid
the blockade casualties which constitute the greatest threat to
our continued neutrality .68
In an editorial examining the opposing forces developing in
Congress over neutrality revision, the Pilot quite objectively stated
that:
the real questions before Congress are not legal questions
at all. They are questions of judgement and opinion purely.
Would the risk of becoming embroiled in Europe Vs war be greater
if we decided to sell arms and ammunitions on a "cash and carry"
basis to the belligerents, or if we retained the present freedom
to sell the belligerents everything in the non-munitions category?

CQ
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There is no way to prove the lesser danger of either
course. It is a question of estimating the probabilities
under‘either course and judging accordingly. . . .69
Just two days after World War IT began, the Norfolk editor
insisted that this country can remain outside the conflict "only if
we make our determination to stay out of war a back-to-the-wall
defensive line to be held at heavy cost, to be supported by all the
intelligence and understanding and poise and firmness that we can
miister."

Americans must remember that "twenty-five years ago when

another European war broke out . . . there was no expectation that we
should be sucked into it."7^

A few days later the editor again empha

sized that "this war originated elsewhere, against our wishes and in
spite of our protests and appeals.

Now that it has come, the American

government must take every protective step that the existence of the
war requires— to preserve our neutrality, to prepare for an uncertain
future, and to maintain our position as an independent people in a
world of danger. "7^
The first reaction of the Richmond Times Dispatch to the outbreak
of World War II was that "this country should never enter into another
European war, unless it is clearly in imminent danger of attack."
The editor considered cash and carry legislation to be "a reasonable
precaution . . ., not only for our own protection, but also in order
to give England and France access to our markets."
endorsed repeal of the arms embargo.

The Dispatch also

After all, "there is no more

impropriety or danger in selling a fighting plane to a belligerent
than in selling him a tanker full of gasoline."
-

,
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In advocating cash and carry., the PdLchmond editor stressed that "we
must bear in mind that both Germany and England are fighting for their
lives, and that it is only natural that both should do everything they
legitimately can, to prevent contraband from reaching the other."

73

As for lifting the arms embargo, the editor declared, "How much better
it would be for us to sell them [England and France] planes now— admitted
ly a partisan gesture of the same sort we are making already in the
shipments of war materials— rather than to refuse these shipments, and
thus to run a grave risk of being drawn into the war later to save
them from defeat!"7^
In an attempt to explain the causes of World War II, the Rich
mond editor remarked, "A lone megalomaniac sitting in the Wilhelmstrasse,
his abnormal mentality overwrought from excessive work and lack of sleep,
has elected to plunge Europe into blood.

. . . [The war] is partly the

outgrowth of the Treaty of Versailles, partly the result of shortsighted
ness on the part of various statesmen, especially Prime Minister Stanley
Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain."

Finally the United States must share

some of the blame for its failure to join the League of Nations.

Except

for this last factor, however, the Allies "got themselves into this mess,
through no fault of ours."

Looking ahead, the editor asserted that "there

will be a determined effort of our former allies in 1917-1918 to drag
us into the conflict.

. . . Let us beware of all their blandishments.

. .

Let us be on guard against the flood of atrocity stories •. . . We
helped the Allies win the last war, and they still owe us nearly
$14,500,000,000."

Even our failure to join the League of Nations "is not

73Ibid., Sept. 14, 1939, p. 10.
74
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sufficient to obligate us to ruin the prospects for democracy’s survival
on this continent."

With our huge debt, our entry into the war "would

make that [depression] of 1929 seem child’s play.

So let’s stay out . . .

This nation is in an altogether different position from the one which,
in 1917, could afford to lavish billions upon the Allies . . . It is
only too likely that the war will bring all the participants down in
ruin, no matter who the nominal winners are.

We, in America, should see

to it that one sound democracy remains around which shattered civilization
can rally, after the conflic is over . " ^
must stay out."

76

"The United States can and

A few days later the Dispatch painted an even more

dismal picture of the likely consequences of United States entry into
the war:
Destruction of the Federal Government’s fiscal soundness,
uncontrolled inflation of the currency, the crashing of banks,
and insurance companies, nation-wide devastation and ruin,
millions of unemployed roaming the streets, with riots, if not
revolution, and the strong possibility of either Communist or
Fascist dictatorship, will be the probable results for us, if
America enters the European war. . . . The Times-Dispatch . . .
is convinced that free institutions will not be preserved on
this continent through our involvement in a. World W ar. Suppose
we entered the war and helped to "win" for the allies, and after
it was all over, we found that all the participants had gone down
in Bolshevism, ourselves included. . . .This paper has never
advocated America’s entry into a European war for the purpose
of crushing Nazi Germany. . . .The United States is not morally,
financially or militarily obligated to
go to the rescue of England
and France, much as it may desire themto win. . . .
Is this the doctrine of pacifism
or of cowardice? Not at
all. This newspaper favors building the armed strength of America
up to whatever level is necessary to insure its safety against
attack. . . .This newspaper is sincerely convinced that the most
unselfish thing for this country to do under the circumstances,
is to be thoroughly selfish, i.e., to look out for its own inter
ests. That is exactly what Britain and France always do. You
may be perfectly sure that they would not come to our assistance,
unless they were certain that this was to their own advantage. .
[We ought not to plunge] into a war which was not of our making,

^~*Ibid. , Sept. 2, 1939, p. 8.
^ I b i d . , Sept. 4, 1939, p. 10.
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arid which is pretty certain to destroy democracy in Europe, no
matter who wins. . . . We spent a vast amount of blood and treasure
in 1917-18, in an effort to save democracy. There is far less
democracy in the world today than there was when we embarked on
that quixotic quest. DonTt let's make the same blunder all over
again, and end almost the last hope of preserving liberty on this
continent.77
In a discussion of the dehumanizing effects of war, the editor
the next day in a reference to the sinking of the Athenia asked, "How
many of us are sufficiently objective to think of the millions of
ctiarming, cultured and patriotic Germans who would no more condone
the sinking of noncombatants on passenger vessels without warning than
we ourselves would . .

.?"

78

Even the President did not escape attack

by the Dispatch in regard to the necessity of objectivity.
questioned, "Why . . . have we no ambassador in Berlin?"

The editor
Also criticized

was Roosevelt's use of the phrase "limited emergency" in a proclamation.
The editor contended that that phrase "conveyed to many the impression
that this neutral country is faced with some immediate crisis."

Finally

t^ie Dispatch objected to the President's statement, although admitting
it was "perfectly true," that "'I cannot ask that every American remain
neutral in thought. . . . Even a neutral has a right to take account of
facts.'"

The Richmond editor asked, "Why insert this gratuitous appeal

to the American people not to be neutral in thought?"

The editor natural

ly concluded that "President Roosevelt is not as neutral as he ought to
be— . . . h e is, at times, traveling dangerously close to unneutrality."

79

An added objection to the President's actions came a week later when the
Dispatch criticized Roosevelt's message to Poland's President for including

77 Ibid., Sept. 10, 1939, p. 2.
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a remark lthat he was "deeply shocked" about the bombings of Poland:
"Mr. Rooseveltfs fdeeply shocked* is a little too reminiscent of the
notes President Wilson was writing to Germany during a previous American
period of neutrality.

The Wilsonian notes did not help to keep us out

of war, and the less partisan writing and talking to Europe that President
Roosevelt now does, the better off we will probably be."

80

The sentiments

of the Times Dispatch were probably best expressed when the editor declared,
"The best course for us . . . is to remain in our own hemisphere, look
after our own democracy, and keep ourselves strong enough to repel any
attacker.

All of the twelve Virginia editors advocated revision of the 1937
Neutrality Act.

In so doing, only the Front Royal Warren Sentinel admitted

without reluctance that repeal of the arms embargo constituted a retreat
from true neutrality.

Indeed, the editors generally insisted that this

country’s neutrality would be strengthened through revision.

Always,

however, they stressed that revision would help keep the United States at
peace.
Generally historians point to the repeal of the arms embargo as
the first significant retreat by the United States from isolationism
during the period between the Nazi invasion of Poland and Pearl Harbor.
It is worth repeating, however, that the Virginia editors considered
their support for the pro-British revision of the neutrality act to be
in harmony with their earlier statements opposing United States eritry
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into another war.

As one historian has written, "most anti-interventionists

. . . favored helping [Great Britain] as much as possible, so long as the
risk of involvement in war could be avoided."

Indeed, he stated:

...even after 1939, when some aid to Great Britain was deemed
advisable, the concept of unilateralism was not abandoned.
The conditions under itfhich isolationists were prepared to grant
such aid would merely have committed the United States to supply
ing money and materials which could be readily spared, in the
interests of defeating Hitler and thus contributing to America’s
welfare .**2
Americans— even the most isolationist ones— had very good reasons
for refining their views by the fall of 1939.

Arguments that all

European countries were equally corrupt and morally decadent were being
shattered by then, and although it would take Pearl Harbor to completely
destroy all Americans 1 belief that their country was impregnable, this
belief was nevertheless being seriously challenged by Hitler's blitzkreig
tactics in Poland.

It should not be surprising, then, that by October

1939,sixty-two per cent of the Americans approached by the Gallup
pollsters favored repeal of the arms embargo.

83

Primarily because of the overwhelming support Southern Congress
men gave President Roosevelt on selective service, Lend-Lease, and other
"interventionist" measures, the South has been considered by most observers
to have been very anti-isolationist following the outbreak of World War II.
Many of Gallup’s polls appear to support this observation.

For instance,

when asked whether the United States should declare war against Germany
and send its military forces to Europe to fight if it appeared that Germany
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was defeating the Allies, forty-seven per cent of the Southerners
responded "yes" in October 1939.

This figure was considerably higher

than the national average of twenty-nine per cent.

84

Yet in an analysis

of American opinion on the war between September 1939 and August 1940,
Dr. Hadley Cantril concluded that "although New Englanders and Southerners
are somewhat more interventionist than people in other parts of the
country, attitudes toward the war seem, by and large, to cut across
sectional as well as rural-urban lines.

The impression gained is that

the people in this country . . . are relatively homogenous in their
opinions."

85

Similarly, Ray Allen Billington in a study of Middle

Western isolationism demonstrated that while the Congressmen from
that section were considerably more isolationist than those from
other areas, the differences in public opinion among the sections,
although present, were not as pronounced.
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The conclusions of

Cantril and Billington would appear to be accurate insofar as editorial
opinion in Virginia is concerned.

Cantril and Strunk, eds.,. Public Opinion, p. 968.
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Opinion," Public Opinion Quarterly, IV (September 1940), 405.
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CHAPTER 5:

EPILOGUE

In 1807 Thomas Jefferson wrote:

"the man who never looks into

a newspaper is better informed than he who reads them, inasmuch as he
who knows nothing is nearer to truth than he whose mind is filled with
falsehoods and errors."'*'

Although "accuracy" and "objectivity" have

become almost sacred terms in twentieth century journalism, the editorial
page remains a legitimate vehicle for the expression of opinions as
opposed to pure facts.

And Jefferson’s observation, at least in re

gard to the editorial page, may still be far from untrue.

Some of

the newspaper editors examined in this study were so susceptible to
contradictions and inconsistencies that one might have been well
advised during the late thirties to pay heed to Jefferson’s views.
Particularly confusing are the editorials in the Williamsburg
Virginia Gazette.

In the same year that it applauded the Senate’s

final defeat of American entry into the World Court, the Gazette
insisted that this country was compelled to play a leading role in
international affairs because of its "superior civilization."

Two

years later the same paper asserted that such an incident as the sinking
of the Panay could not provoke the United States into war; yet the
editor strongly opposed the Ludlow proposal and urged the English-speaking
peoples to unite to put down aggression and to uphold the principles of
the Nine Power Treaty.

The Williamsburg editor’s initial reaction to

^H. A. Washington (ed.), The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,
V (Washington, 1853), 92.

123

124

the Czechoslovakian crisis was that the United States should remain
aloof.

Within a week, however, the editor displayed a willingness to

see this country fight, "if necessary."

The South Boston Halifax Gazette,

particularly in 1939, was also vulnerable to criticism for its contra
dictions.

Although other editors frequently voiced mixed and confusing

reactions to events abroad, particularly to the Munich Conference, the
Virginia Gazette was the most consistently confusing of the twelve news
papers .
Any attempt to discover a pattern in views among the twelve
editors can also be frustrating.

The range of editorial opinion is

best represented by the Louisa and Norfolk papers.

Always loyal to

President Roosevelt, the Louisa Central-Virginian appeared convinced
that the chief executive would keep the United States out of war.
The Louisa editor’s isolationist views were illustrated best in his
praise for Chamberlain’s actions at Munich— praise that continued until
the very eve of the invasion of Poland.

The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot,

on the other hand, viewed the Munich agreement as an "ill-smelling peace"
and was doubtful as early as 1935 that this country could remain free
from any "general conflagration."

The Pilot’s internationalist stance

was reflected further in its approval of the Quarantine Speech and its
repeated warnings against over-optimism concerning the neutrality
legislation.
Yet, a number of the newspapers adhered to positions that were
similar enough to make possible the general observations found at the
end of each of the chapters in this study.

Although recognizing the

need to scrutinize propaganda and the actions of the munitions makers,
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most of the editors believed that the neutrality legislation provided
the best means for this country’s avoidance of another war.

In regard

to specific conflicts such as the Ethiopian invasion and the China
Incident, the sentiments of most of the papers were echoed in the
Charlottesville Daily Progress’s assertion that "not all the oil in
Ethiopia is worth a single American life" and the Richmond Times
Dispatch Ts contention that "the sooner this country pulls out of the
Far East, and lets it stew in its own juice, the better."

When the

chances for a European war increased in the fall of 1938, the editors
frequently expressed their relief that this country was fortified by
oceans.

When war actually did break out a year later, changing the

neutrality act to help the Allies became the acceptable means for pre
venting United States entry.
Despite such views as these and\ despite the results of the Gallup
polls noted in this work, historians continue to write with little or
no qualification that the South during the late thirties was "the most
international area in outlook."

2

Alexander DeConde has declared that

the period before the Second World War was "a high point in Southern
internationalism,"

3

and C. Vann Woodward has written that the South

during the same period "was the least isolationist and the most inter
nationalist and interventionist part of the country."^

2

Jacobs, "Roosevelt’s ’Quarantine Speech,’" p. 492.

3
DeConde, "The South and Isolationism," p. 333.
4
C.
1968), p. 158.

Vann Woodward, The Burden of Southern History (Baton Rouge,
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The neat dichotomy between an isolationist Republican Midwest and
an internationalist Democratic South deserves serious study.

Perhaps

too much emphasis has been placed on geography and politics.

Even in

the Congressional voting patterns, too often support for increased
armaments has been equated simply with anti-isolationism.

Clearly, how

ever, the Virginia editors viewed their support for repeal of the arms
embargo and for increased armament spending as a kind of "preparedness
isolationism” that would help to keep this country out of foreign
conflicts, not as a step in the direction of war.
Considering the strong isolationist sentiments reflected in many
of Virginius Dabney?s editorials through 1939, it seems a bit ironic
that the Richmond Times Dispatch editor should suggest a year after the
Nazi invasion of Poland that the South displayed a more mature and
sophisticated recognition and understanding of world dangers and
foreign affairs than did other parts of the nation."*

If a study of

Southern newspapers demonstrates that pre-World War II editorial opinion
was in accord with that of the Times Dispatch, it might be said that
the South was not so enlightened as Dabney depicted it to be, at least
not before the outbreak of the w ar.

During the period between the

invasions of Ethiopia and Poland, memories of Woodrow Wilsonfs Great
Crusade and fears of another Great Depression served to contribute
to a definite anti-internationalist strain in Virginia editorial opinion—
a strain that could prove to be of significant interest to diplomatic
historians if it is demonstrative of how Southern editors as a whole felt.

^Dabney, "The South Looks Abroad," pp. 171—178.
Below the Potomac, pp. 287-289.

r

Also see Dabneyfs
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